

2006 • 2007

PART OF THE SECURITY MONITOR STUDY



EKOS

Wave 4:

Security *and* Civil Liberties:
Options for an Evolving Public
Outlook on Security

**Security *and* Civil Liberties:
Options for an Evolving Public Outlook on Security**

Wave 4 of the **Security Monitor** 2006-7 Study



March 2006

The Security Monitor is protected by copyright. No part of the report or other findings from the study may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from EKOS Research Associates Inc. Organizations that subscribed to the study are permitted to distribute the findings internally for their own internal uses.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Overview	2
Government Responses	9
Security & Civil Liberties	21
Perception of Threat	33
Victims of Terrorism	39
Health Concerns	53
Borders	63
Defence	71
Security Agencies	85
Appendix: Research Methodology	95

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, EKOS launched its Security Monitor study. Now in its sixth year, the study continues to demonstrate how dynamic the safety and security landscape is in Canada. These shifts are sometimes unexpected and can alter the public context in terms of policy and the delivery of security services.

The salience of security and threat is much higher today than it was at the close of the last decade and issues related to public security are increasingly critical to the evaluation of broad government performance. Security issues are also becoming crucial yardsticks by which citizens measure the performance of governments.

Today, the Security Monitor study is one of the most important examinations of the public's perceptions of issues of safety and security in Canada. Findings from the past year's Monitor reinforced the need for ongoing monitoring of the public's continually evolving outlook. Pertinent events such as the London transit bombings, rising chaos in Iraq, gun violence in Toronto, Hurricane Katrina, the changing role of the Canadian Forces, and the global focus on a potential influenza pandemic have all had an impact on the public's outlook. Likewise, the continued, intense, and rising concerns about threats linked to climate and the environment demonstrated the breadth of concerns about the nature of threats today. Events such as these have reinforced the dominance of what we have labelled the "security ethic" which has implications for the public's expectations of the state to act as a guardian of risk or risk manager.

The 2006-7 study continues to focus on the evolving safety and security landscape in Canada. The results of the fourth wave are based on a survey with a national random sample of 1,003 Canadians undertaken in February and March 2007. The methodological details are shown in the appendix to this report.

Overview

Over the past few years, the dominance of the constellation of values, attitudes and beliefs which we have called the “security ethic”¹ has remained largely unchallenged. Yet beyond the relative salience of security in the lives of citizens in this new century, there are a number of interesting public cleavages and some recent shifts in key trends. We will comment on some of these changes, and their implications for governments.

Before considering some of the more notable recent findings, we suggest that we may be witnessing the emergence of visible boundaries to the life cycle of the security ethic. This is true in terms of both shorter term tensions and instabilities as well as deeper, longer term viability issues. Questions of the longer term prospects for the continuation of the security ethic are based largely on these factors:

- i. the emerging next generation who will depose the hegemony of the baby boomer generation reveal profoundly lower levels of concern with risk and security as societal priorities. In fact, the unusual preponderance of aging boomers in current societal demographics is one of the crucial factors explaining the unusual current emphasis on risk and security;
- ii. historically, hope and fear appear to operate in a cyclical pattern and we should inevitably expect a return to a more optimistic and confident outlook at some point in the future; and
- iii. eventually, there should be some rational economic adjustments which should correct for disproportionate expenditures on perceived risks which are incommensurate with their statistical occurrence.

When the current stranglehold which the security ethic exerts on society will diminish and be replaced is difficult to say. It is unlikely to occur in the next five years but it is also difficult to imagine this transformation not occurring over the next decade. Depending on the rapidity of the transition, there may be dramatic pressures on the federal government to quickly refashion itself to deal with a profoundly different set of pent-up priorities, interests and values from the next generation.

¹ By “security ethic”, we refer to a broad bundle of values attitudes and beliefs which accompany an era where citizens of advanced western societies are elevating issues of risk and security beyond normal levels. This includes a heightened (often exaggerated) general sense of risk; a rise in the emphasis citizens place on security and in the role and expectations of the State; greater emphasis on values such as protection and safety; diminished relative emphasis on civil liberties and human rights; a more pessimistic view of the longer term future and a tendency to lean to a more parochial rather than cosmopolitan world view.

Shorter Term Fluctuations/Trends: Relaxation of Peak Fears

One of the more noteworthy trends evident in recent data is a modest but significant across the board decline in risk perception. Both the sense that world has become more dangerous and that a terrorist attack in Canada is inevitable continue to decline. While this mild relaxation of fear is still a much less potent driver of public attitudes than residual insecurity levels, it is a potentially important shift that bears close monitoring.

In general, we find sense of risk is much lower amongst younger Canadians and Quebecers. Another important security pattern is the link between social class, economic vulnerabilities, and broader risk perceptions. Those members of society who are least affluent and powerful also feel the greatest sense of generalized fears in other areas of their lives (e.g., health, crime, and terror). This vulnerable segment is particularly challenging from a policy and communications perspective. From a policy perspective, they reveal exaggerated and relatively one-dimensional fears which often contradict rational risk management. From a communications perspective, they exhibit very low levels of political fluency and limited awareness and attention levels, and thus it may be unlikely for the government to be able to read or rationally engage these segments of the population.

The recent diminution of risk may explain some of the instability and rising concerns evident in tracking indicators associated with the pace of security measures and the tradeoffs with privacy and civil liberties. These are still less important forces than the forces in favour of security and the security dominance is clearly evident in broad tradeoffs. It is noteworthy that this trend to relaxing fears may be opening up a widening fault line across Canada-U.S. public outlook. There is little evidence of abatement in security fears in the United States, despite huge internal disagreement about how to deal with security.

Into this mix we note that the border and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative continue to produce very high levels of public attention. We see burgeoning demand and take-up of passports in growing recognition of this requirement. Air travellers reveal no real difficulties with the requirement but there is a disturbingly sizable segment of road travellers who are either unwilling or unable to comply. Coupled with a general rise in support for less porous borders (which we have seen emerging in *both* the Canadian and American publics), these trends may be placing pressure on the future of trade liberalization in North America. They also occur against a backdrop of contrary U.S.-Canada public trends on attitudes to security risks and immigration which may cause problems in future Canada-U.S. relations.

Ironically, the Security Monitor and other related EKOS evidence suggest that Canadians are both mindful and respectful of American security exigencies (and believe WHTI measures will strengthen security at the border). Moreover, both Canadians and Americans favour greater cooperation and coordination as best strategies for improving border security. Canadians rated current security at the border as fairly good and Americans clearly rate Canada as the most benign of all foreign threats to American security. So, in spite of the potential for a damaging collision of national interests

around the border, there is considerable public support in both countries for a more cooperative and coordinated approach to border security which acknowledges the “done deal” nature of the passport requirement.

Another recent factor at play has been the relative absence of terror-security stories and the relative salience of civil liberty abuse stories – most notably the Arar case which has received very high attention. Through time, we have found that security shocks (e.g., London bombings) have had deeper and longer-lasting impacts than stories associated with civil liberties. There have, however, been almost no significant security stories registering in the past several months. Moreover, unlike the United States public which have seen ongoing carnage associated with Iraq, Canadians have been relatively insulated from the Iraq troubles. Meanwhile, the Afghanistan mission has seen more optimistic coverage and a marked decline to the troubling casualty toll of last summer.

Public Outlook on Defence and Afghanistan

In lockstep with the emergence of the new public security ethic, we have witnessed a radical transformation of Canadian public outlook on defence and foreign policy. Consider the state of public outlook at the close of the last decade when defence was seen as an atrophied, somewhat anachronistic institution. Despite broad sympathy for military personnel, there was a sense that our military was poorly equipped and under-resourced. Public anxieties, however, were focused elsewhere on issues such as health care and there was little support for the massive reinvestment necessary to arrest the decline. Defence was a low priority and imagery of its broad purpose was still steeped in the blue-helmet peacekeeping model drawn from the middle part of the last century.

Today, Canadians believe that a more muscular military is a necessary ingredient of serious presence on a much more dangerous world stage. The military, and the Afghanistan mission in particular, have become the most visible face of the federal government. There has been also a steady increase in the recognition that it is no longer just about peacekeeping but increasingly a more aggressive and hazardous “peace-support” role.

The mission in Afghanistan is the most recalled feature of the military and indeed of the federal government. There has been a clear and surprising recent rise in public support for the mission. From overwhelming initial support in 2001, support steadily declined to the point where the public were highly polarized and leaning to opposition. This occurred over the past several years. Apart from strong supporters (around 30 per cent) most of the public were highly skeptical of arguments that this mission would root out terrorism abroad before it affected us here. Arguments such as helping reconstruction and democratization, acquitting ourselves of our original legal and moral obligations, and a sense that this would strengthen relations with the United States (strained from what Canadians overwhelmingly saw as the correct decision to abstain from the Iraq mission) were all much more persuasive arguments (particularly outside the core of strong supporters).

Over the past several months, the erosion of support has stopped and in our most recent polling we have actually seen a significant rise in support. This now sees a slim majority once again supporting the mission. This rise in support may well be a product of a shift to more effective communications. It is also linked to a weakening of the key drivers underlying opposition.

Interestingly, the public have claimed that mounting casualties were *not* the key factor underlying mounting opposition. Discounting some of the public' claims here (opposition *did* rise concurrently with casualties), it is still important to consider the main reasons the public says they oppose the mission. Along with other factors, perhaps the crucial new factor was a growing sense of futility and despair; there might be good reasons to be there, but the sense was that we were increasingly engaged in a hopeless exercise. This sense of futility peaked last summer and was linked to broader disappointment with Iraq and seemingly intractable hostilities in the Middle East. As in the United States, this sense of futility was fostering incipient isolationism and dampening enthusiasm for internationalism (but to a much lesser degree than the full blown neo-isolationism we now see gripping the American public).

In recent months, however, there has been a decline in the sense of abject futility and hostility in the external world. This, coupled with more effective communications and less daily bad news on the casualty front, has produced a surprising upward shift in support. The issue does, however, bear careful monitoring and the underlying anatomy of support and opposition suggests the current favourable outlook is fragile at best.

Public Expectation of the Role of the State in Security

Even through their own best efforts, individuals cannot adequately safeguard themselves against threats like terrorism (let alone more conventional dangers associated with natural disasters, exotic new viruses, or environmental toxins). They also cannot realistically look to the private or third sector to provide reasonable protection against the panoply of conventional and emerging threats worrying contemporary citizens. As fears associated with these risks have risen, they have exerted a transformation of public expectations for the role of the state. Increasingly the public expects governments to act as a guardian or protector managing some of the big threats which fall outside of the influence of individuals. It is also the case that the criteria for political success and failure are measured against a security yardstick.

First of all, it is remarkable that in an era of increased devolution and privatization, the public overwhelmingly anoint the federal government with the principal responsibility for dealing with security threats. It does not really matter what the locale for a terror or catastrophic event, the public assigns responsibility to the federal government. This mixed public blessing comes with a series of daunting challenges, but also some fairly clear guidance about expected role.

One of the crucial challenges is the segmentation of the public on these issues. There is a profound generational chasm and in many respects, the fears and focus of the aging boomer cohort are increasingly disconnected from the more cavalier and cosmopolitan outlook of younger Canadians. Furthermore, the deep generalized dread of the economically vulnerable entail a very different communication strategy than the more nuanced concerns of the more educated nationalists who are much more sensitive to concerns of privacy, civil liberties, and perceived propinquity to U.S. foreign policy.

There is no single overall policy or communication strategy which will solve the riddle of managing the often contradictory expectations and values of an increasingly pluralistic and critical citizenry. There is, however, room for improvement.

One of the key challenges lies in seeking a practical equilibrium of effective risk management and risk communications. The notion of a rational technocratic calculus of risk management may have some surface appeal, but it suffers from two immediate flaws. First of all, the "science" of risk management is elusive. Recall that risk managers and engineers used to estimate the likelihood of catastrophic nuclear power plant malfunctions in thousands of years; that was pre-Chernobyl or Three-Mile Island. More recently, the spurious "expert" consensus of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) underpinned the rationale for the Iraq misadventure. So the public will justifiably resist the state's authority for rational risk management.

The second flaw with a technocratic approach is that increasingly success or failure in the political arena is determined by how well parties and candidates are judged against this yardstick. Bureaucratic officials will be hard pressed to explain to politicians that policy must ignore public irrationalities when these are critical to success or failure in the political marketplace.

So does this mean that public policy should be held captive to an auction of who best assuages the real and imagined fears of an anxious public? Clearly not. Good policy and sound communications must understand the need to provide a practical balance of perceived comfort *and* rational risk management. It is pertinent that virtually none of the public expect government to be a source of "emotional support". Bill Clinton may have effectively "felt the pain" of his citizens, but Canadians eschew this role from the federal government. The key roles which are assigned to the federal government include protection, communication, and redress. Leaving aside the protection (risk manager) role, the current research sheds some light on the other two roles: communication and redress.

Generally speaking, the current level of communications from the government is not commensurate with the public's expressed level of interest. Given the salience of security, people want to know more about the current blueprint and where to turn when in need. A more explicit overview of what the government is doing (i.e. "we're minding the store) and who is responsible for what would not only raise meagre awareness levels, it would also help to increase Canadians' comfort with the security agenda. Instructively, we have seen that those with greater awareness of government

actions have a more favourable outlook. Most of the research on risk communications suggests that increasing public awareness of real versus spurious risks, increasing level of household preparedness, and letting citizens know where to turn would all help increase public confidence.

In addition to explaining the security plan, there is also unmet public appetite for the government to increase its role as agent of redress. As we saw with the Arar case and our most recent survey data, Canadians expect the federal government to offer both financial compensation and assurances that there are mechanisms in place to deal with similar problems in the future. Some of these mechanisms already exist, but as our previous research and new data on the Commission for Public Complaints show, few Canadians are aware of the existence of these types of organizations. Despite very low awareness, most Canadians support them and prefer this type of arms-length review to a face-to-face confrontation with the agency under scrutiny. Raising the volume on redress and oversight, may help counterbalance the unusual lean to security while recognizing the growing concerns of some of those segments of society less comfortable with this recent historical skew.





Government Responses

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Perceptions of the Government of Canada's handling of the security file continue to fluctuate. While a consistent majority (53 per cent) **approve of the government's direction on national security**, this is down slightly from the last sounding (57 per cent "right direction" in January 2007). This slight drop in approval can once again be attributed to a **rise in uncertainty** (rather than increased dissatisfaction). As we have seen in the past, those that are aware of actions the government has taken to improve safety and security (59 per cent) are more supportive of the government's agenda.

Direction of government on national security

Q: All things considered, would you say that the Government of Canada is moving in the right direction or the wrong direction in terms of national security?





Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

A plurality of Canadians (42 per cent) also continues to **approve** of the amount and pace of **changes the government has introduced to deal with terrorism** specifically. For those that **disapprove**, the **lean is still towards** seeing the changes as being introduced **“too slowly”** (29 per cent) rather than **“too quickly”** (19 per cent). Over the past year, however, the **perception that the government is moving “too quickly” has nearly doubled** (up from 10 per cent in February 2006) and is the highest we have observed to date. Those living in Quebec (24 per cent) and the university educated (26 per cent) are the most likely to consider the changes as having been rushed.

Attitudes towards changes to deal with terrorism



Q: Thinking about the amount and pace of changes the Government of Canada has announced to deal with terrorism, do you think they are moving ...



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. n=1003

Awareness of security measures

Q: Do you recall hearing about any actions that the Government of Canada has taken to improve public safety and security in the past year?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Awareness of specific measures

Q: What activities do you recall hearing about?*


	Mar. 03	May 04	Mar. 05	Aug. 06	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
Airport / air security	75	50	29	25	34	25
Legislation/government laws	--	4	4	14	21	24
Border security	45	35	30	31	26	19
Investigating terrorism in Canada	5	2	5	14	7	16
Increased policing/intelligence	6	4	4	15	7	8
National identity card	4	4	2	13	5	7
Immigration/deportation	9	6	5	9	6	6
Crime decreasing	--	--	--	--	--	5
Canada's ports	--	4	3	8	2	4
War / investing in military	--	6	8	4	3	1
Actions to address the environment	--	--	--	--	--	1
Passport requirements	--	--	--	1	1	1
Other	4	2	7	1	9	3
DK/NR	11	18	20	16	19	23

Base: Canadians with prior awareness; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=516

Despite displaying strong opinions on the matter, about **1 in 2** Canadians consistently admits to knowing very little about steps the Government of Canada has taken to improve public safety and security over the past year. Among those with some awareness, **changes to airport / air security, legislation, and border security continue to dominate top-of-mind responses.** That said, airport / air security and border security are mentioned far less often today that they were four years ago. Terrorist investigations, on the other hand, are increasingly resonant (mentioned by 16 per cent – up from seven per cent in October 2006) and the government’s law and order agenda is not going unnoticed (decreasing crime rates mentioned for the first time by five per cent).

Awareness of the Anti-Terrorism Act

Q: In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Government of Canada introduced anti-terror legislation known as the Anti-Terrorism Act (formerly Bill C-36). Before this survey, do you recall hearing anything about the Anti-Terrorism Act?



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003


With just over **half of Canadians** (52 per cent) saying they have **heard of the Anti-Terrorism Act**, awareness of the Government of Canada's anti-terrorism legislation is somewhat higher than overall awareness of their efforts to ensure safety and security. Canadians of higher socioeconomic standing (62 per cent of the university-educated and 64 per cent of those with reported annual salaries of \$100,000 or more), and non-visible minorities (54 per cent compared to 40 per cent of visible minorities) are most likely to be aware of the legislation.

Apart from their awareness of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Canadians were also asked about their **views on two provisions** in the legislation that were recently sunsetted: half of the sample was asked about **recognizance with conditions** and the other half about **investigative hearings**. In both cases, results indicate that **Canadians support these measures** (at least in principle), suggesting that, if consulted, the public would have likely supported extending these provisions.

Views on recognizance with conditions

Q: Some of the provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act have recently expired. One of the expired provisions related to recognizance with conditions, also known as preventative arrests. This provision allowed police to bring a person before a judge without pressing charges if they had reasonable grounds to believe that this would prevent a terrorist attack. Which of the following two statements comes closest to your own point of view?

- 1) I think police should be able to bring a person before a judge without pressing charges in the case of a potential terrorist attack.
- 2) I DO NOT think that police should be able to bring a person before a judge without pressing charges, EVEN in the case of a potential terrorist attack.




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample

With respect to recognizance with conditions, a **majority** (59 per cent) feels that, in the case of a potential terrorist attack, **police should be able to bring a person before a judge without pressing charges**. There is, however, **also sizable opposition** to the use of such measures (35 per cent). Those who approve of the government's overall direction on security (64 per cent) are more likely to support the use of recognizance with conditions.

Views on investigative hearings

Q: Some of the provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act have recently expired. One of the expired provisions related to investigative hearings. This provision allowed a judge to order a person to disclose any information they had regarding terrorist activity, as long it did not result in self-incrimination. This provision could only be used in two situations: to try and prevent a terrorist attack or to investigate a terrorist attack after it occurred. Which of the following two statements comes closest to your own point of view?

- 1) I think judges should be able to order a person to disclose information if it could prevent or help investigate a terrorist attack.
- 2) I DO NOT think that judges should be able to order a person to disclose information EVEN if it could prevent or help investigate a terrorist attack



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample

The case for investigative hearings, on the other hand, is more straightforward: **8 in 10 (83 per cent) support judges being able to order a person to disclose information that would prevent or help investigate a terrorist attack** and only 1 in 10 oppose. As with recognizance with conditions, those who feel that the government is moving in the “right direction” on national security are more likely to support this provision (88 per cent).





Security & Civil Liberties

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Legal challenges to society's security response place the system under scrutiny and can provide an opportunity to examine the affects of some of the measures that have been put in place. In this iteration of the Security Monitor, we examine the public's awareness of and attitudes towards two such challenges: the Maher Arar case and the Supreme Court rulings on security certificates.

Awareness of the Maher Arar case

Q: Do you recall hearing or seeing anything about the Maher Arar case?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample

Specific awareness in Arar case

Q: What do you recall hearing about?

	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
Deportation / torture in Syria	48	52
Not guilty finding in inquiry	38	29
Reparations being sought / given	--	25
RCMP error / insufficient evidence	26	21
Followed case (unspecified)	--	7
Arar still not allowed in the United States	--	5
Heard Arar had terrorist training	2	1
Other	7	3
DK/NR	14	12

Up to 3 responses accepted


Base: Canadians who have some awareness of the case; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=316

Despite having a great deal of resonance in the media, currently just over **1 in 2 Canadians (58 per cent)** recall hearing anything about the **Maher Arar case**, which is not substantially higher from when the Security Monitor first began tracking in February 2004 (53 per cent). For those aware of the case, the **original story of Mr. Arar's deportation and detention in Syria remains most top-of-mind** (mentioned by 52 per cent). The fact that Arar was exonerated by a public inquiry and that he was awarded a formal apology and compensation package from the Government of Canada seems to be secondary (recalled by 29 and 25 per cent, respectively).


Awareness of the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling on the constitutionality of security certificates is also rather **modest**, with fewer than 1 in 2 (48 per cent) having heard about the decision. Although media reporting suggested that security certificates had been found unconstitutional, only aspects of the procedure were found to be violation of sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. About half (50 per cent) of those aware of the decision as reported in the media indicate that they support the ruling, and 1 in 3 (33 per cent) oppose it. Support for the decision is higher among the university-educated (56 per cent).

Supreme Court ruling on security certificates

Q: The Supreme Court of Canada recently ruled on the issue of whether or not the security certificate procedure complied with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Do you recall hearing anything about this ruling?



Q: Would you say you support or oppose the Supreme Court's ruling that security certificates are unconstitutional?*





*Wording of question replicates media reporting of the Supreme Court's decision. Technically speaking, although aspects of security certificates were found to be in violation of sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they were not struck down as "unconstitutional" in their entirety.

Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n= half sample; *only asked of those aware of Supreme Court ruling

With such highly publicized challenges to the government's security response, it is perhaps not surprising to see some **push back on the civil liberties front** in this iteration. While Canadians continue to lean towards protection of security (54 per cent) over the guarantee of civil liberties (39 per cent), **the gap between these two goals has declined** significantly since the last sounding (from a 27-point gap in January 2007 to a 15-point gap in March). Interestingly, Canadians who support the government's direction on national security are more likely to place an emphasis on security (62 per cent), whereas those who oppose the government's agenda are more likely to emphasize civil liberties (52 per cent).

Civil liberties vs. security trade-off

Q: Recognizing that both are important in today's world, which of the following do you feel the Government of Canada should place the most emphasis on . . . or . . . ?





Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Likewise, although the public remains polarized over the issue (43 per cent favour and 41 per cent oppose), **support for granting additional security powers** to police and intelligence agencies has also **subsided somewhat** since January 2007 (down two percentage points). We see a similar split in terms of the security-civil liberties divide on this issue: those that support the government's direction on security are more likely agree that police should be given enhanced powers to ensure security (48 per cent), whereas those that oppose the government's agenda are much less likely to see additional powers as being necessary (only 36 per cent agree).

Necessity of granting additional security powers

Q: Police and intelligence agencies should have more powers to ensure security even if it means Canadians have to give up some personal privacy safeguards.



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003





Perception of Threat

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

The perceived dangerousness of the world has declined significantly since the fall of 2006, and is actually at its point lowest since tracking began in May 2003. Currently, a **plurality** (49 per cent) consider the **world “more dangerous”** (compared to 63 per cent in October 2006). This is being countered by a **growing sense that things are “about the same”** as five years ago (38 per cent – up 10 per cent since October 2006), perhaps a recognition that the **world has changed indelibly since the terrorist attacks of 9/11**. There is also a small but growing proportion that considers the world to be safer (12 per cent – up five per cent from October 2006).

Perceived safety/danger of the world

Q: From your own point of view, do you feel that, overall, the world is safer, more dangerous, or about the same as it was five years ago?





Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Following the arrest of Canadian terrorist suspects in the summer of 2006, the belief that a terrorist attack on Canadian soil was imminent increased dramatically (from 43 per cent in February to 61 per cent June 2006). Nearly a year later, perceptions have finally returned to pre-arrest levels, with **slightly fewer than 1 in 2** (44 per cent) agreeing that a **terrorist attack is inevitable**. It is worth noting that fears remain elevated among Canada's visible minority population (52 per cent agree that it is only a matter of time before there is a major terrorist attack on Canadian soil).

Is a terrorist attack in Canada inevitable?

Q: It's just a matter of time before there is a major terrorist attack on Canadian soil.



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003



Victims of Terrorism


PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

The affects of terrorism are far reaching and can be difficult to measure. In this iteration of the Security Monitor, we examine the issue of compensation for those directly affected by terrorism and for those who have been affected through the injury or loss of a loved one.


Understanding of current compensation rules in the event of a terrorist attack either in Canada or in another country where Canadians are killed or injured is very low. A **plurality** thinks that **victims and their families are *not* financially compensated**; however, almost as many are not willing to venture a guess and only about 1 in 5 thinks that victims and their families are compensated. Asked on the other hand **whether or not they *should* be compensated** and a very different result is produced: **72 per cent** say they should be if the **attack occurs in Canada** and **60 per cent** if the **attack occurs in another country**. Support for providing compensation to victims in either scenario is higher among women (68 per cent), youth (77 per cent), and residents of Quebec (74 per cent).

Compensation for victims of terrorism

Q: Based on what you know, ARE victims or their families financially compensated in the event of a terrorist attack ...?



Q: Based on what you know, SHOULD victims or their families be financially compensated in the event of a terrorist attack...?




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample (rotated for each question)


Those that think that victims and their families should be compensated were then asked about their support for different types of compensation. Overall, there is **majority support for providing each of the examined forms of compensation**. The coverage of **medical expenses is seen as most important** for both victims (89 per cent) and their families (83 per cent). Three in four also support compensating victims for lost wages and pain and suffering and for compensating families for funeral costs, travel expenses, and for the loss or injury of a loved one.

Support for different types of compensation for victims and families

Q: If you were a victim of a terrorist attack in Canada or abroad, do you think you should be compensated for...



Q: If a loved one was killed or seriously injured in a terrorist attack in Canada or abroad, do you think their families should be compensated for...




Base: Those who think that victims and their families should be compensated; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=643

When it comes to responding to the needs of those involved in a terrorist attack, **Canadians place most of the onus directly on the Government of Canada.** Indeed, 3 in 4 (74 per cent) thinks the federal government should take primary responsibility for responding to the needs of Canadians involved in a terrorist attack on Canadian soil. Even in the event of a terrorist attack in another country, a slight plurality (45 per cent) thinks that the Canadian federal government should be accountable to the Canadians involved. Slightly fewer (41 per cent) place the responsibility on the government of the country where the attack occurred.


There are some interesting regional variations on this issue. Across Canada, those living in British Columbia (15 per cent) and Alberta (23 per cent) are more likely than those living elsewhere in the country to say that all three levels of government should share the responsibility of responding to those involved in a terrorist attack on Canadian soil.

Level of government responsible to victims

Q: In the event of a terrorist attack in Canada, which government should take primary responsibility for responding to the needs of Canadians involved?




Q: In the event of a terrorist attack in another country where Canadians are injured or killed, which government should take primary responsibility to responding to the needs of Canadians involved?



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample (rotated for each question)

Support for compensation to be deducted from other sources

Q: Should payments received by victims or their families from other sources such as insurance policies be deducted from the compensation they may receive from the government?




Base: Those who think that victims and their families should be compensated; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=643

When asked about the complicated issue of whether or not payments received by victims or their families from other sources (e.g., insurance policies) should be deducted from any form of compensation package received from the government, respondents are divided. While a **slight majority** (51 per cent) **does not think payments from other sources should be deducted from government compensation packages**, almost as many (44 per cent) think they should be deducted. Youth (55 per cent) and Canadians of higher socioeconomic standing are more likely to support making these types of deductions (51 per cent of the university-educated and 54 per cent of the highest income earners).

Best way to disseminate information to victims of a terrorist attack

Q: In the event of a terrorist attack in Canada, which of the following do you think would be the most effective way of getting information to victims and their families?




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

In the event of a terrorist attack on Canadian soil, Canadians perceive **television as the most effective way of disseminating information to victims and their families** (36 per cent choose this method). Having access to a toll-free number (26 per cent) or receiving information over the radio (16 per cent) are also seen as viable options. Fewer than 1 in 10 think that the Internet, email, or newspapers would be the most effective.

Source for emotional support in the event of a terrorist attack

Q: In the event of a terrorist attack in Canada, where would you be most likely to turn for emotional support?




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Not surprisingly, **most Canadians** (67 per cent) say they would turn to their **family for emotional support in the event of a terrorist attack in Canada**. No other group (e.g., friends, religious leaders, professionals), was cited by significant numbers. There are some regional differences of note. Canadians living in the Prairies and Atlantic Canada are more likely to look to religious leaders for support (15 and 13 per cent respectively compared to seven per cent at the national level), whereas residents of Quebec are more likely to look to professionals (22 per cent for victim services workers, counselors or medical professional compared to 10 per cent nationally).

Support for the use of public funds to compensate victims

Q: After the Air India disaster, the Government of Canada provided travel funding to families who wished to attend the trial in British Columbia. Do you approve or disapprove of using public funds in this manner?



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

The Air India disaster is a concrete example of compensation being provided to the families of victims of a terrorist attack involving Canadians. Referencing what was done in this case, Canadians were told that the Government of Canada provided travel funding to families who wished to attend the trial in British Columbia and were asked whether or not they supported to use of public funds in this manner. Overall, a majority (60 per cent) say they support this type of compensation and about 1 in 3 oppose (33 per cent). Men (40 per cent) and residents of Alberta (46 per cent) are more likely to oppose.




Health Concerns

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Keeping Canadians informed about potential health threats

Q: I think the Government of Canada is doing a good job keeping Canadians informed of all the potential threats from health crises such as viruses or diseases.




Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

As we near the end of flu season, we asked Canadians whether or not they were aware of the risks associated with this virus and if they felt prepared to deal with a potential epidemic or pandemic. As a starting point, we find **Canadians less likely to agree that the Government is doing a good job of keeping them informed** of all the potential threat from health crises than they were 18 months earlier (47 per cent compared to 54 per cent in September 2005). Residents of Quebec are particularly likely to feel vulnerable on this issue (only 40 per cent agree).


Although they feel less informed by the government, Canadians are more likely to report having heard about a potential influenza epidemic or pandemic (70 per cent “aware” compared to 60 per cent in 2005). Perhaps because of their greater levels of awareness, Canadians are also slightly more likely to say they are familiar with the health risks associated with an epidemic or pandemic: 48 per cent rate their level of familiarity between 5 and 7 on a 7-point scale (where 1 is not at all familiar and 7 is extremely familiar) compared to 44 per cent in 2005. Seniors (20 per cent) and visible minority Canadians (21 per cent) are the most likely to say they are “extremely familiar”.

Awareness of / familiarity with potential flu pandemic in Canada

Q: Do you recall hearing anything in the past six months about the potential for an influenza epidemic or pandemic?




Q: How familiar would you say you are with the health risks associated with an influenza epidemic or pandemic?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Perceived likelihood of a flu pandemic in Canada

Q: How likely do you think it is that Canada will be affected by an influenza pandemic in the next five years?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

There has been a **steep decline in the perceived likelihood of Canada being affected by an influenza pandemic in the next five years**. Fewer than 1 in 2 (44 per cent) rate the likelihood between 5 and 7 on a 7-point scale (where 1 is not at all likely and 7 is extremely likely) compared to more than 1 in 2 (58 per cent) in 2005. Not unexpectedly, **those who have heard about the potential for an influenza epidemic or pandemic in the next six months are more likely to consider this a real possibility** (50 per cent rate the likelihood between 5 and 7 compared to 37 per cent of those who have not heard about a potential epidemic or pandemic).

Preparedness for a flu pandemic

Q: In order to be prepared for, and to know what to do should there be an influenza pandemic facing Canada, would you say you...to know what to do.

	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
...are confident that you have all the information you need...	7	9
...think that you have enough information...	20	21
...would definitely need more information...	72	70
DK/NR	1	1

Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Despite the fact that Canadians are now more likely to say they are familiar with the health risks associated with an influenza epidemic or pandemic, individual level of preparedness remains largely unchanged from 2005. Indeed, a **large majority of Canadians (70 per cent) continue to say they “would definitely need more information” to know what to do in the event of an outbreak of an influenza pandemic in Canada.** About 1 in 5 (21 per cent) think they might have “enough information to know what to do in general” and fewer than 1 in 10 (nine per cent) are confident that they have all the information they need. Canadians with a high school education or less are most likely to indicate needing more information (76 per cent).

Best protection against the flu

Q: In your opinion, what is the number one thing you can do to help protect yourself against any type of flu?

	Sep. 05	Feb. / Mar. 07
Wash hands frequently	32	47
Get vaccine / flu shot	29	24
Healthy lifestyle / proper nutrition	12	7
Avoid large crowds of people / more cautious interactions	5	6
Take vitamins	4	3
Better personal hygiene	2	3
Stay inside	4	2
Become better informed	2	2
Take anti-viral medication	1	1
Regular visits to doctor	--	1
Wear a surgical mask	--	1
Other	2	1
DK/NR	7	4

Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Frequent hand washing is increasingly seen as the best form of protection against the flu mentioned by almost 1 in 2 respondents (47 per cent compared to 32 per cent in 2005). Getting a vaccine or flu shot is also seen as effective (mentioned by 24 per cent – down slightly from 29 per cent in 2005). Other responses mentioned by fewer than 1 in 10 range from having a healthy lifestyle and proper nutrition to wearing a surgical mask in public places.



Borders


PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Canadians have mixed attitudes towards security at the Canada-U.S. border. By a margin of 2 to 1, the public leans towards seeing security on the Canadian side of the border as “good” (43 per cent) rather than “poor” (22 per cent). However, there is also 1 in 4 (26 per cent) who are neutral on the subject. Residents of Ontario (48 per cent), visible minorities (51 per cent), and Canadians with an up-to-date passport (48 per cent) are more likely to rate security as being “good”.


As for Canada-U.S. cooperation on border security, most (64 per cent) think that governments in the two countries currently work together on this issue to a “moderate extent”. Their preference, however, would be for greater cooperation: **75 per cent think the federal governments in Canada and the United States *should* work together in this area to a “high extent”**. This gap between perceptions and expectations of cooperation can, at least in part, be attributed to the fact that Canadians are not overly aware of initiatives aimed at improving security at the border (only about 1 in 5 currently mention border security when asked about their awareness of actions taken by the government to improve security and safety over the past year).

Perceptions of border security

Q: How would you rate security on the Canadian side of the Canada-US border?



Q: To what extent do you think the federal government in Canada and the United States ... work together in the area of BORDER SECURITY?




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003


Although already remarkable, **awareness of requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has grown**. In August 2006, 85 per cent of Canadians were aware of the plans to require a passport for travel to the United States. With the passport requirement for air travel now in effect, that number stands at 92 per cent. In comparison, **awareness of plans to extend this requirement to all travelers to the United States by 2009 is considerably lower** at 78 per cent. Although awareness is still generally high for this type of an issue, the fact that 1 in 5 have not heard about this could be problematic as the potential impact of requiring all travelers – not just air travelers – to present a passport when entering the U.S. is much greater.

Awareness of current and future WHTI requirements

Q: Since January 23, 2007, the United States has required all travelers, including American and Canadian citizens, to present a passport when flying into the U.S. Before this survey, had you ever read or heard anything about this new requirement?




Q: And, have you ever read or heard anything about the United States extending this new requirement to all travelers entering the U.S. by any mode of transportation by 2009?



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Impact of WHTI requirements on border security

Q: If it were mandatory to have a passport or another type of security identity document to cross the Canada-U.S. border by any mode of transportation, do you think this would improve border security?





Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Canadians are fairly **positive about the potential affects of the WHTI requirements**. About 2 in 3 (65 per cent) think it will **improve border security** and about 3 in 4 (73 per cent) say it will **not affect their plans to travel to the United States**. In fact, fewer Canadians say that they would be less likely to go to the United States for either business or pleasure reasons than before it became mandatory to have a passport for air travel (24 per cent compared to 34 per cent in August 2006). Residents of British Columbia (27 per cent) and visible minority Canadians (32 per cent) are somewhat more likely to say that their travel to the U.S. will be affected by the new requirement.

Impact of WHTI requirements on plans to travel to the U.S.

Q: If it were mandatory to have a passport or another type of security identity document to cross the Canada-U.S. border by any mode of transportation, would you be any less likely to go to the United States for either business or pleasure reasons?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003




Defence

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Attention to issues affecting the Canadian Forces remains high, with over 8 in 10 (82 per cent) reporting having read, seen, or heard something recently. Men (86 per cent), older Canadians (86 per cent between the ages of 45 and 64 and 89 per cent of seniors), and the university-educated (86 per cent) are more likely to be engaged on these issues. It is the CF's **activities in Afghanistan** that **continue to dominate the Canadian consciousness** (mentioned without prompting by 62 per cent). When we last asked about awareness in October 2006, reports of fatalities and injuries were top-of-mind for nearly 1 in 3 respondents (31 per cent). Now, these are mentioned by fewer than 1 in 10 (six per cent).

Awareness of issues affecting the Canadian Forces

Q: Have you recently read, seen or heard anything about the Canadian Forces?



Q: What did you see, read or hear?


	Sep. 05	Feb. 06	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
Activities in Afghanistan	33	48	66	62
Need for more troops	11	8	13	13
Peacekeeping	13	8	5	8
Under funding	18	10	4	7
Advertising/recruiting	1	1	3	6
Rising death toll / injuries in Afghanistan	--	--	31	6
Given more funding	4	8	1	2
Debates about troops being in Afghanistan	--	--	--	2
Other*	4	3	3	11
DK/NR	13	13	4	7

*Other items in this category mentioned by 1 per cent of respondents include: equipment problems, possibility of sending troops to Iraq, soldiers returning from Afghanistan, media coverage (unspecified), training standards for new recruits, support for Afghanistan mission, controversy involving General Hillier (e.g., conflict with government), and family members of soldiers reaction to Afghanistan.

Base: Canadians with awareness of issues affecting the CF; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=841

Awareness of military operations in Afghanistan

Q: Over the past few weeks, do you recall hearing, reading, or seeing anything about Canada's military operations in Afghanistan?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003



Despite dominating the top-of-mind responses, Canadians are somewhat less likely to recall having recently seen, read or heard anything about Canada's military operations in Afghanistan than they were in the fall (80 per cent compared to 85 per cent in October 2006). Yet, support for the current type of operations has never been higher, with more than half (52 per cent) saying that the Canadian Forces should be playing a "peace-support" rather than a peacekeeping role (43 per cent). Preference for the current type of operations is higher among those living in the Prairies (64 per cent), men (58 per cent), those 45 to 64 years of age (57 per cent), and Canada's most affluent (61 per cent).

Preferred role for the CF: traditional peacekeeping vs. peace-support

Q: Which of the following two statements is closest to your own point of view? Canadian Forces should...

participate in **broader peace-support operations** around the world which could involve both peacekeeping and, if necessary, non-traditional roles such as fighting alongside other allied troops to implement peace in a disputed area.

only participate in **traditional peacekeeping operations** around the world that involve observation duties or monitoring a truce between two conflicting partners.





Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Canadians' understanding of the Afghanistan mission appears to have stabilized. Currently, approximately **7 in 10** (71 per cent) correctly **identify Canada's mission as a peace-support operation**. Likewise, the perception that Canada is taking part in a traditional peacekeeping mission continues to decline (17 per cent down from 21 per cent in August 2006). Residents of Quebec (24 per cent), youth (30 per cent), and visible minority Canadians (26 per cent) are more likely to think that Canada is participating in a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.

Literacy on Afghanistan mission



Q: Based on what you know, do you think the Canadian Forces operation in Afghanistan is a traditional peacekeeping operation or is it a peace-support operation?



Base: Only asked of those with at least some awareness of CF operations in Afghanistan; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=831

Attitudes towards a peace-support role in Afghanistan


Q: Right now, the Canadian Forces are involved in a broader peace-SUPPORT operation in Afghanistan, helping to rebuild the country and maintain security with our troops fighting on the frontline if necessary. Would you say you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose these contributions?



Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Regional attitudes towards peace-support role

Q: Right now, the Canadian Forces are involved in a broader peace-SUPPORT operation in Afghanistan, helping to rebuild the country and maintain security with our troops fighting on the frontline if necessary. Would you say you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose these contributions?



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

While not the highest it has ever been, support for Canada's military contributions to Afghanistan has rebounded from the fall (63 per cent up from 58 per cent in October 2006). While strong opposition to the mission is fairly entrenched at 18 per cent, some of the softer opposition appears to be moving to support ("somewhat oppose" down four points to 16 per cent). The most noticeable rise has been in "strong support" (up four points to 30 per cent). Support for the mission remains highest in the Prairies (77 per cent) and lowest in Quebec (44 per cent).

Canadians were given the opportunity to explain their position on Canada's role in Afghanistan. For the minority who **oppose** the operation, the **most common response is that "Canada is not helping / situation is getting worse"** (mentioned 39 per cent of the time). It is important to note, however, that this **sentiment has decreased** significantly from October 2006 (down 12 percentage points). The argument that **"it is not our place / our war"** is now almost as common (mentioned 38 per cent of the time).

Reasons for supporting Canada's role in Afghanistan are more diverse.

When this question was first posed in October 2006, **"Helping to liberate the people of Afghanistan"** was the number one reason (mentioned 31 per cent of the time). While this is still seen as important, it is cited with much less frequency (currently mentioned 21 per cent of the time). Instead, there is a **growing sense that it is Canada's duty to help countries in need** (mentioned 32 per cent of the time up from 26 per cent in October 2006). Other reasons for supporting the Afghanistan mission include: fighting terrorism (17 per cent), being patriotic (10 per cent), and honouring Canada's commitment to NATO (nine per cent).

Reasons for position on peace-support role in Afghanistan

Q: Why do you OPPOSE the Canadian Forces' broader peace-support operation in Afghanistan?

	Sep. 05	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
Not helping / situation getting worse	--	51	39
It's not our place / our war	64	39	38
Against war / violence (in general)	23	6	20
Troops not equipped	--	6	5
Other	--	--	2
DK/NR	18	8	5

Up to 3 responses accepted

Q: Why do you SUPPORT the Canadian Forces' broader peace-support operation in Afghanistan?

	Oct. 06	Feb. / Mar. 07
Fulfill Canada's duty (e.g., to help countries in need)	26	32
Help liberate people of Afghanistan	31	21
Fight terrorism	14	17
Patriotic / support our soldiers	15	10
Honour Canada's commitment to NATO	--	9
Must complete the work we started	5	4
Other	1	1
DK/NR	7	6

Up to 3 responses accepted

Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07, those who OPPOSE peace-support role (n=332) and those who SUPPORT peace-support role (n=640)

Justification for Canada's role in Afghanistan

Q: Even if you do not support the current mission, what do you think is the strongest reason for Canada to have a military role in Afghanistan? Is it because it will...

	Feb. / Mar. 07
Promote peace / resolution; play a peacekeeping role	17
Honour Canada's commitment to NATO	12
Assist in efforts to rebuild infrastructure	11
Provide aid / help countries in need	10
Maintain / improve relations with the United States	9
Participate in the war on terror	6
Humanitarian reasons (e.g., protect human rights)	5
To protect national security	4
There is no convincing reason	4
Promote image of Canada on world stage	2
Other	2
DK/NR	17

Up to 3 responses accepted

Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

When all Canadians (regardless of their views) are asked what the strongest reason is for Canada to have a military role in Afghanistan, the top reasons cited sound a lot like the type of role Canada has played in past conflicts. These include promoting peace (17 per cent), honouring Canada's commitment to NATO (12 per cent), helping rebuild the country's infrastructure (11 per cent), and providing aid (10 per cent). A few other less traditional reasons such as maintaining relations with the U.S. (nine per cent) and participating in the war on terror (six per cent) are also mentioned.





Security Agencies

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Although the reputation of the RCMP has shown to be resilient to criticism (e.g., from the O'Connor inquiry), confidence in this agency did slip slightly over the past few months. Following this period of decline, however, **confidence in the RCMP is beginning to climb** (both "high" and "moderate" confidence is up 2 percentage points each in this iteration). Those who feel that the government is moving in the "right direction" on national security are more likely than others to express confidence in this agency (43 per cent "high confidence" compared to 22 per cent who oppose the government's direction).

Confidence in the RCMP

Q: How much confidence do you have in the RCMP?




Base: All Canadians; most recent data point Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample

In this iteration of the Security Monitor, we took the opportunity to explore, for the first time, Canadians awareness of and attitudes towards the RCMP's oversight body, The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. While **overall awareness of the Commission is rather modest** (39 per cent have some awareness), understanding of it's role is not. For those aware of the CPC, 1 in 2 (51 per cent) know it is **responsible for addressing / investigating complaints against the RMCP**. Others correctly suggest that the Commission is the "RCMP watchdog" (17 per cent) and that it receives complaints against the RCMP (14 per cent).

Across the country, awareness of the CPC is highest in British Columbia (52 per cent) and lowest in Quebec (26 per cent). Older Canadians (51 per cent between the ages of 45 and 64 and 57 per cent of seniors) and those with a university education (47 per cent) are also more likely to be aware of the Commission.

Awareness of the Commission for Public Complaints (CPC)

Q: Have you ever heard of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP?




Q: Based on what you have heard, what is it that you think the Commission for Public Complaints does?*

	Feb. / Mar. 07
Address / investigate complaints against the RCMP	51
RCMP watchdog (e.g., protect rights of the public)	17
Receive complaints about the RCMP	14
Doing very little / seen as biased	10
Resolves problems / makes recommendations	5
Other	1
DK/NR	18

Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003; *Asked of those who are aware of the CPC (n=429)

Importance of CPC

Q: The Government of Canada established the Commission of Public Complaints to receive and review allegations of inappropriate conduct by RCMP members. How important is it that there is an independent review body whose role is to monitor the activities of the RCMP?




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

The modest levels of awareness of the CPC does not detract from the perceived importance of this type of organization. Overall, 2 in 3 Canadians (66 per cent) consider it **“important”** that there is an **independent review body to monitor the activities of the RCMP**, and an additional 1 in 3 consider it “somewhat important”. Fewer than 1 in 10 (four per cent) say that the existence of this type of organization is “not very important”. Residents of British Columbia (74 per cent) and Atlantic Canada (77 per cent) are more likely to consider the CPC “important”, as are those who think the government is moving in the wrong direction on national security (70 per cent compared to 64 per cent who approve of the government’s direction).

Level of comfort making a complaint against the RCMP

Q: If you wanted to make a complaint about the RCMP, how comfortable would you feel going to ...?*




Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=half sample (rotated for each question)

There are two primary avenues available to Canadians wishing to lodge a complaint against the RCMP: they may make a complaint directly to the to the RCMP or they may contact the Commission with their concerns. In order to test Canadians' level of comfort with these two options, half of the sample was asked about making a complaint to the RCMP and the other half to the Commission. Results show that **Canadians feel much more comfortable approaching the Commission** (61 per cent "comfortable" compared to 42 per cent for the RCMP). In fact, those asked about making a complaint to the RCMP are almost as likely to indicate feeling "uncomfortable" about doing so (38 per cent).

Preference for accessing the complaints system

Q: And what would be your preference for accessing the complaints system? Would you prefer to make a complaint...



Base: All Canadians; Feb. / Mar. 07 n=1003

Canadians show a slight preference for accessing the complaints

system in person (37 per cent), although access by telephone (31 per cent) or email (29 per cent) are close behind. The option of sending a complaint by regular mail receives the least support (15 per cent).

There are some interesting demographic variations on this indicator. For example, a majority of residents of Atlantic Canada (53 per cent) say they would prefer to access the system in person. Men (44 per cent) and those with a high school education or less (44 per cent) are also more likely to prefer this approach. Making a complaint by email, on the other hand, is preferred by youth (42 per cent) and the university-educated (36 per cent).



Appendix: Research Methodology

PART OF THE **SECURITY MONITOR** STUDY

Research Methodology

The methodology planned for the 2006-7 Security Monitor study involves a total of nine waves of research to be conducted over the course of the study.

- Six regular waves involving a telephone survey with a national random sample of 1,000 Canadians.
- One benchmarking wave (near the beginning of the study). This wave focuses on core issues and designed to develop a better profile of Canadians in the safety/security space. This survey involves a sample of 2,000 Canadians.
- One survey with a national random sample of 1,000 Americans.
- One survey with Canadian public and private sector decision-makers.

The results from the final wave are based on the following:

- A telephone survey completed with a stratified national random sample of 1,003 Canadians, aged 18 and over undertaken between February 27 and March 8, 2007.
- The findings were statistically weighted by age, gender and region to ensure that the findings are representative of the Canadian public aged 18 and over.
- In areas, the survey was designed to randomize questions in order to test differences in attitudes across various indicators as well as to minimize response burden.
- Findings from questions posed on the full sample may be considered accurate within +/- 3.1 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. The margin of error for questions posed on a half sample is +/- 4.4 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

	Field Dates	Surveys	Margin of error
Wave 1	Oct. 20-30, 2006	1,008	+/-3.1 percentage points
Wave 2	Dec. 11-17, 2006	1,012	+/-3.1 percentage points
Wave 3	Jan. 17 – 24, 2007	2,018	+/-2.2 percentage points
Wave 4	Feb. 27-Mar. 8, 2007	1,003	+/-3.1 percentage points