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LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING FORWARD

FIVE BIG FORCES SHAPING OUR SOCIETY

JANUARY 9, 2013

Outline

Outline	1
Introduction.....	1
Force One: A Shrinking Middle Class and an Increasingly Isolated Über Affluent	2
Force Two: From the Greening to the Greying of North America	8
Force Three: Social Media Isn't Helping	11
Force Four: Values Slowly Shifting Away from Right as Government Does Opposite	14
Force Five: The New Political Marketplace	18
Detailed Tables.....	20
Methodology.....	43
Annex 1: Social Media, Socioeconomic Status, and Democratic Health.....	45

Introduction

On the cusp of another year, it is customary to take stock of the past and what it might mean for the future. There is an ample inventory of newsmakers, events and personalities assembled by the media and pundits. What I wanted to do here is look beyond these more specific things and look for the broader social forces producing really important changes in our society and our future. To qualify for this list, the forces must be beyond the obvious news of the day and they must be operating in ways that are either largely hidden from mainstream discussion or even working in ways opposite to the received wisdom. Another feature which will distinguish this list is that there is at least some empirical evidence supporting the contention that these are crucial forces. All of these forces are rooted in longer term trends and have implications for the foreseeable future. While these five forces are by no means discrete nor are they an exhaustive list of the engines of our future, I believe they are all either misunderstood or not receiving attention commensurate with their importance to our lives. These forces are rooted largely in the realm of culture, social organization and the economy. In our wrap up, we will relate these forces back to the current state of politics and why the political realm is increasingly incapable of recognizing let alone solving the critical challenges of our time.

Force One: A Shrinking Middle Class and an Increasingly Isolated Über Affluent

Is this the beginning of the End of Progress?

Discussions of class structure and class tensions are hardly the mainstream of year end reflection. Yes we see concerns with the “middle class” have now become a mainstay of political leaders in Canada and the United States; in a way that resembles the recent rush to “family” as the key to political triumph. Beyond the typical bromides about the importance of a healthy middle class and how they need to find their lives affordable and optimistic again, there are some truly profound shifts going on. These movements are by no means healthy and taken together may spell nothing less than a deep rupture in the notion of inevitable progress which has underpinned the miracle of liberal capitalism since it emerged in the eighteenth century.


Despite the glib pronouncements of an end of history, the death of state socialism and the final triumph of the West, which were pervasive themes in the late nineties, there are now grave doubts about the present and future of the advanced western economies. The American and Canadian dreams of a better future extracted from hard work and ingenuity are fading and being replaced with a grimmer sense that not only are we not doing better than our parents but that the next generation will confront a starkly darker future. Whatever meagre profits do emanate from stagnant western economies are increasingly appropriated by a tiny cadre of über rich who don’t really participate in the mainstream of society.

The fraying of the progress ethic should be of grave concern to all of us. Max Weber argued that it was the Protestant ethic which produced the spirit of capitalism¹. This ethic transformed into a secular dream of progress that fuelled the unimaginable ascendance of the West. If modern citizens truly believe that progress is over, the Western day in the sun is completed and that the best we can do is hunker down in the vain hope that this somehow will fix itself; this belief will become part of a vicious circle and a self fulfilling prophecy.

¹ Weber, Max, and Talcott Parsons. “*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*”. New York : Scribner (NY), 1930. Print.

Figure 1-1: Long-term personal financial outlook

Q. Thinking ahead over the next five years or so, do you think your personal financial situation will be better or worse than it is today?




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BASE: Canadians; most recent data point November 20 – December 3, 2012 (n=5,433)

And while the ascendance of the BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), the stagnation of Western economies and unprecedented concentration of wealth are realities, the end of Western salience is hardly a manifest destiny. What is more disturbing than the challenges we confront is the collective despair we see in our tracking of public mood. Looking at Figure 1-1, we see that the exuberant optimism which defined the close of the twentieth century in Canada has given way to pessimism and even resignation that has slowly and steadily evolved over the past decade. The evidence is clear that economic outlook is on a slow and steady downward cycle to the point that it many fear this slide will become a maelstrom. The main economic policy offerings of the political world do not seem to have arrested this erosion and may well be seen as part of the problem.

Figure 1-2: Most important issue for discussion

Q. Which of the following do you think should be the most important issue in discussions about Canada's future? Should it be: 1) social issues like health and education; 2) issues related to the economy like economic growth and jobs; 3) Fiscal issues like taxes and debt; 4) Issues such as the growing gap between rich and poor; or 5) none of these?



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
BASE: Canadians; February 21-28, 2012 (n=3,699)

Many claim that this sense of falling backward is neither unique nor particularly troublesome. As our research has shown in time series the first point isn't true and the latter response seems a rather blasé attitude to a converging set of bleak economic outlook indicators. We have speculated that the rising economic success of non Western nations, the failure of Western-US foreign policies in the Middle East and rising signs of fiscal and debt crises have all contributed to this malaise. The other key factor is rising inequality and a failing middle class. Our evidence has shown that as economic issues have become the dominant concerns for Canadians they are for the first time in our research twinned at the pinnacle of public issues with blended concerns about fairness and inequality (see Figure 1-2). This is not the traditional and more modest concerns we have seen about the gap between the rich and poor. The new and more potent linkage is the gap between the über rich and everyone else. Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in what can only be described as the crisis of the middle class.

The middle class has always been by far the most popular self-defined class location in upper North America; one of the reasons it is such a popular political target. The twentieth century ascension of the USA to the "hyper power" status it enjoyed as little as a decade ago was largely the culmination of an unprecedented period of middle class ascendance. This probably began in the origins of that nation, but most clearly expressed itself in the expansionary period which followed the great depression and continued almost uninterrupted till the close of the twentieth century. Canada largely followed in lockstep and it was not unusual in the sixties and seventies to see Canada and the USA at the top of the standard of living charts (they are now well down that list and have been so for some time).

Figure 1-3: Tracking self-rated social class

Q. Would you describe you and your household as poor, working class, middle class, or upper class?




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Figure 1-4: Change in well-being

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?




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BASE: Canadians; November 20-29, 2012 (n=1,181)

In our tracking over the past decade or so we have seen something new and important happening to that category of self defined middle class. The middle two-thirds who called themselves middle class has now make up less than half of the population (see Figure 1-3). Moreover, there is a virtual public consensus that over the past generation no class has fallen more steeply from economic grace than the beleaguered and shrinking middle class (see Figure 1-4). To put this as simply as possible, the middle class is shrinking, pessimistic and convinced that it is the clear loser in the economic reordering of the last twenty five years.

Figure 1-5: Impact of inequality on work ethic

Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The growing concentration of wealth among the richest Canadians has a strong demotivating effect on others to work hard and apply their best efforts".




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In analysing why societies fail, Daron Acemođlu has a very insightful theory that the harbinger of societal failure (from greatness) is the shift from an "inclusive" to an "extractive" economy². The burgeoning of upper North America's middle class in the twentieth century is the example par excellence of a successful inclusive economy. Among other examples, Acemođlu shows how Venice went from backwater to world powerhouse and back to a sterile urban museum in waiting when it shifted from an inclusive to an extractive economy (see the NYT article on the self destruction of the one percent for an excellent synopsis of this point). The diminution of taxes and public services, the rise of the one percent has seen a similar shrinking and relative decline in the North American economy and could be a chilling harbinger for our future economic well being.

² Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. "Why Nations Fail the Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty", New York: CROWN GROUP (NY), 2012. Print.

Figure 1-6: Perceived changes in quality of life over time



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BASE: Canadians; February 21-28, 2012 (n=3,699, half-sample each)

There are few if any modern examples of economic and societal success which do not see a rising, optimistic and growing middle class. These features are common to all of the modern emerging Asian powerhouses. In Canada, we have a shrinking, stagnant, and pessimistic middle class which has lost faith in the ethic of progress. Uncorrected, this will lead to inevitable further decline. The fact that only 14 per cent of the public think their children will inherit a better world (see Figure 1-6) underlines just how staunch the challenge is. This dark future is by no means inevitable but the dominant challenge of our time is to reverse this infectious belief that progress is over and produce a vibrant new liberal capitalism for the twenty first century. Growing and invigorating the dormant middle class is task one in any blueprint to a brighter future.

Force Two: From the Greening to the Greying of North America


The new gerontocracy and why it couldn't be more poorly timed

Canadian society has never been older. The more apocalyptic grey tsunami scenarios are no doubt exaggerated as we can see in successful Scandinavian societies which are faring very well despite the 'pig-and-python' demographic. Yet there is something disturbing about the new generational fault lines in Canada.

These problems are expressed clearly in both the economy and even more vividly the political realm. Youth unemployment is extremely high, the notion that post secondary human capital is worth the ever mounting debt associated with it is weakening and the new gen Y and millennial entrants find a labour market cluttered at the far end with the stubbornly entrenched boomers who have seen 'freedom 55' morph into freedom 75 and beyond.

Figure 2.1: Political ideology

Q. Do you consider yourself a small "c" conservative or a small "l" liberal?



Note: Figures adjusted to exclude those who did not provide valid responses.

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BASE: Canadians; November 20-28, 2012 (n=1,181)


Moreover, younger Canada is dramatically different from older Canada. It is much more ethnically diverse; it grew up digitally and has different attitudes to community, privacy and authority. It is also much more secular and better educated than previous generations. We also now see a widening gap emerging on core values as the socially conservative values still powerful in older Canada have little relevance to younger Canada (see Figure 2.1).

All of these differences place young and old Canada in a state of often contradictory values and economic interests (noting large areas of coincidental values and interests as well). The tensions

may be no greater than the enflamed tensions of the sixties and early seventies but one does not get the sense that the dramatic reforms to racial discrimination and civil rights, women’s equality, and the end of the cold war which resulted from that period of conflict are on the horizon for this generation. Couple this with an unusually grim outlook on the economic future and we can see the ingredients of a major problem for an aging society that desperately needs the innovation and dynamism of its younger cohort to fend off the daunting economic challenges we face.

Figure 2-2: Perceived treatment of older vs younger Canada

Q. About half of Canada’s population, younger Canada, is under the age of 42, while the other half, older Canada, is over 42. Do you think the Government of Canada focuses more on the values and interests of younger Canada or older Canada?



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When we look to the realm of politics in Canada, the picture grows darker still. Simple political arithmetic can make some of the point. Twenty years ago, younger and older voters were roughly similarly sized portions of the electorate (13 and 15 per cent, respectively). Today, older voters are relatively fifty percent larger share of the overall electorate (12 versus 19 per cent).³

As the older cohort grew relative to younger voters, the young vote started to tune out. In the 1990s, voting rates among youth plummeted approximately 15 percentage points while seniors’ voting rates remained steady.⁴ Today, seniors out-perform youth on Election Day by a margin of

³ Figures derived from Statistics Canada CANSIM table #051-001, accessible online at: <http://goo.gl/F2zzU>

⁴ Source: Barnes, Andre, “Youth Voter Turnout in Canada: 1. Trends and Issues”, Library of Parliament publication #2010-19-E, April 2010. Accessible online at: <http://goo.gl/gYVMJ>

nearly two-to-one.⁵ Effectively, a younger voter has about one-third to one-quarter the impact today that they did twenty years ago.

Throwing one final ingredient into the mixture we note that while the senior vote tended to be fairly evenly split across Liberal and Conservative options in the past it now shows dramatic convergence around the Conservatives. Putting these three factors together goes a long way to explaining why a federal government which champions values of security, safety, respect for authority, family values etc. has been so successful.

From the vantage point of political calculus, it makes great sense to consolidate a vote around emotionally resonant policies and communications which will appeal to a group that will vote en masse for you. By corollary, it makes sense to discourage the participation of younger voters (who won't vote for you if they were to show up) through negative advertising and policy positions that are of little or reverse interests to younger voters. The net result, however, is a gerontocracy which reflects the exaggerated and imagined fears of older Canada precisely at the time when we urgently need the more optimistic and innovative outlooks of the relatively scarcer younger portion of our society. So good politics becomes highly suspect as a tool for meeting the severe challenges of the twenty first century.

This growing disjuncture between the public interest and what works in the realm of the political marketplace is a stern challenge and the mounting generational tensions in our society are just one particularly unwelcome expression of this.

⁵ Source: Elections Canada, "Estimation of Voter Turnout by Age Group", 2004-2011. Accessible online at: <http://goo.gl/7SxUb>

Force Three: Social Media Isn't Helping


Why Huxley – not Orwell – had it right

Internet 2.0 (surely we are at least at 3.0) is transforming our society in ways we couldn't even have imagined twenty five years ago. The Internet is the new mass media and social media is now the avidly consumed by most Canadians, particularly those below our median age of 41 years (it was around 26 at the last Centennial celebrations of 1967)⁶.

This isn't merely a change to our popular culture; social media is at the heart of the North American economy with the Facebook IPO the biggest economic event of the past year. Notably, on the day that Facebook purchased Instagram (still too fresh a name to be recognized by my spell check) for one billion dollars the venerable New York Times was valued at 900 million dollars.

Figure 3-1: Role of social media in democracy

Q. As you know, the use of social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter has increased dramatically in recent years. Some people argue that social media is good for democracy since it offers new ways of participating in politics and communicating with the public. Other people argue that social networking is harmful to democracy, since many people will use these websites as a substitute for real world action. Which of these statements comes closest to your own point of view?



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BASE: Canadians; December 14-21, 2011 (n=2,005)

When we ask the public their views on what impacts social media are having on overall quality of life in general and democratic health more particularly, the responses are overwhelmingly positive (see Figure 3-1). Virtually everyone thinks that social media is a liberating force which is enriching and broadening democratic and societal health. Putting aside the irony that this consensus comes at a time when barometers of democratic health are at historical low points in

⁶ Source: Statistics Canada, "Population by broad age groups and sex, counts, including median age, 1921 to 2011 for both sexes – Canada", 2011 Census. Accessible online at <http://goo.gl/ziubF>

our tracking, we are left puzzled about these nearly unanimous thumbs up on the salubrious impacts of social media.

Clearly, there are many wonderful applications of social media and as an enthusiastic fan of twitter I can attest to its value, fun and occasional danger. It is still puzzling to see how in an era where mistrust and scepticism are both very high, social media has largely escaped critical public scrutiny. I will leave the question of the plausibility of building a future economy on the rather ephemeral world of social media to more qualified experts. I will, however, note that the Facebook IPO has become the 'Faceplant' event in the minds of burned investors and I never really understood how 'poking' our way to recovery was a solid long-term strategy for fending off the emerging Asian economies.

In Canada, there has been an explosion of interest in the use of social media as a form of political expression. Online communities and petitions abound and the Twitterverse is awash in critical commentary of the most dramatic sort. In work presented after the last federal election, Mike Colledge of Ipsos noted that during the 41st election campaign, the tone of the Internet shifted from a relatively balanced ideological tone to a decidedly more left of center tone⁷. More notably, this bore no resemblance to the outcome of the election itself.

Some have argued that the less strenuous 'click' democracy available to denizens of the social media universe is becoming an ersatz touchstone which occludes the importance of authentic political participation. Moreover, those who vigorously contest the policies of the day in the world of social media, and who believe that this is really making a difference become more embittered as this delusion is shattered in the real world of elections. In Canada, younger voting hasn't risen in tandem with the rise of social media (quite the contrary). Social media are crucial tools to fund raising and political mobilisation as we have seen in the past American election (where youth voting was much higher than in Canada's last federal election).

On a final note, it is worth taking a look at the socioeconomic demographics (i.e., income and education) underlying today's 'social mediaphiles'. In the past, Internet consumption was positively associated with socioeconomic status (SES) and labour force outcome. Our most recent labour force study, however, suggests that high social media consumers now display lower SES and are faring more poorly in the labour market⁸.

In the past year, Allan Gregg delivered a penetrating and courageous critique of the current government where he likened the current regime's strategy to political techniques evident in the nightmarish world of *1984*⁹. While applauding this speech, I would demur on the reference to Orwell and the notion that individual rights have been usurped in the service of totalitarian control (I do agree heartily with the assault on reason theme).

⁷ See Colledge, Mike "The 2011 Federal Election: Lessons Learned", presentation to the Marketing Research and Intelligence Association, September 22, 2011. Accessible online at: <http://goo.gl/pVHPY>

⁸ See Annex 1

⁹ See Gregg, Allan, "1984 in 2012 – The Assault on Reason", notes for remarks to Carleton University, September 5, 2012. Accessible online at: <http://allangregg.com/?p=80>

Instead, I return to Neil Postman's seminal 1985 book entitled *Amusing Ourselves to Death*. In this work Postman argues that it is Huxley's *Brave New World* which is a more prescient dystopia than Orwell's *1984*. The citizen surrenders their rights unconsciously in a never ending pursuit of mindless entertainment.

Perhaps social media has become the *soma* of the twenty-first century.

Force Four: Values Slowly Shifting Away from Right as Government Does Opposite


As we have already recently developed this theme, we will not review it in depth but we will comment more on its implications and connections to some of the other forces. We believe that this force merits discussion for two reasons. First, values are the crucial normative goalposts which define a society and should shape its direction. They reflect what citizens see as right and wrong and what kind of society they would like to hand off to the next generation, how they would like their society to be seen by the external world. When values do shift – and they move at a glacial pace – it is very important. Unlike more mercurial opinions and attitudes, values constitute a moral charter which underpins a society's trajectory. Their importance to national governments is obvious.

Secondly, we believe that there are some huge gaps and distortions in our understanding of national values and how these have been changing. In particular, the claim that Canada is blueing or shifting to the right has been offered as both a genuine measure of value change and as legitimization for further movements in national policy in that direction.

The idea that there can be a consensual, consistent set of values framing a pluralistic society such as Canada is a chimera. Many contradictory values are held tenaciously which leave little room for central terrain (e.g. right to life, right to choose, capital punishment/abolition, gun control, right to bear arms). It is also the case that many core values are not divisive ideologically (e.g. freedom, respect) and most Canadians hold positive views of both small-c conservative values and small-l liberal values.

Figure 4-1: Most important goals and values

Q. If you were to direct Canadian society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be?



With these important caveats in mind, let me state clearly that there is virtually no plausible evidence in place to suggest that Canada is shifting to the right on social values. The success of parties of the right is not a product of a rightward shift nor is the presence of a right of centre party in Ottawa moving the public to the right. In reality, the factors that are moving values are far deeper and transnational than those within the purview of national governments. The values shifts that we see continuing in Canada are part of broader rhythms of post-materialism which are evident throughout the advanced western world (and which may be becoming more global in nature).


While explicitly excluding fiscal conservatism from this claim, we can say without hesitation that the evidence is clear that Canadians are significantly *less* connected to socially conservative values than they were twenty years ago. This includes values such as respect for authority, traditional family values and minimal government (which may stray into the realm of fiscal conservatism).

Even more important, these values are much less relevant in certain portions of Canadian society such as younger Canada, metropolitan Canada, and university-educated Canada. In short, these socially conservative values have little relevance to the emerging, next Canada. While those values are highly motivating to the older core Conservative vote they are next to meaningless to the groups mentioned above.

A similar analysis of shifts in values and demographics in the United States has led Stanley Greenberg (former Clinton pollster) to refer to Republicanism as a “dying cult”. While the political success of the Conservative Party in Canada would belie such a glib depiction here, those value gaps are even more pronounced in Canada and may soon cause issues of basic legitimacy. This may also be linked to a deepening generational divide that we discussed in an earlier article.

Figure 4-2: Personal sense of belonging

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...



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BASE: Canadians; November 20-29, 2012 (n=1,181)

Are these value shifts weakening Canadians' attachment to country or undermining a sense of belonging to Canada? The answer, evident in Figure 4-2, is no, or perhaps not yet. Just as values are not shaped by activities of the state, it appears that national attachment is quite robust in spite of these newer normative tensions.

Canadians' sense of belonging to the nation has remained very strong but the locus of national identity has shifted somewhat. Where in the past it was more connected to small-l liberalism, it is now more connected to small c-conservatism. The frustrated Canadian nationalism that Roger Gibbins noted simmering in Alberta in the nineties has now largely evaporated and Alberta is now the province most connected to Canada.

There are new fault lines around values and some of these are quite worrisome. But so far, national attachment has remained robust and some of the frustrated nationalists who once were on the outside of power are feeling very happy about the new order.

A final important note on the issue of ethnic identities. Like provincial identities, ethnic identities are exerting a weakening attraction for Canadians. This is important and interesting for two reasons.

First, the visceral fears of the early 1990s about immigration and multiculturalism weakening national identity appear to have been ill-founded. Second, ethnic identification declined over a period when ethnic heterogeneity increased quite dramatically.

All of this is good news. Canada appears to be a singular success story in managing the "clash of civilizations" problems which are plaguing Europe and the United States.


Force Five: The New Political Marketplace

Why political technology is widening the gap between the public interest and politics and why citizens seem helpless in dealing with this

Our most recent soundings of democratic health reveal a deeply mistrustful public, perhaps more so than at any time in the past thirty years. Some of this mistrust is rooted in the broad value shifts that we discussed earlier. A less deferential, less respectful of authority, and more sceptical public pose deep challenges to governments. Increasingly, it appears that political parties are attempting to solve these problems not through policy solutions but through better political technology. The irony is that this strategy may well be worsening the problem and steering ever closer to a basic legitimacy crisis (see Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-1: Tracking trust in government

Q. How much do you trust the government in Ottawa to do what is right?



Note: Most recent figure recalculated to exclude those who answered "Don't know/No response".

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BASE: Canadians; most recent data point November 20 – December 3, 2012 (n=5,433)

Since Theodore White's *The Making of a President*, the connection between marketing and politics has been clear to most people. It seems that each year, there is some new political technology which is raising the stakes in the ecology of predator-prey which characterises political practice. Whether it is wedge politics and the culture war strategies pursued by Rove et. al. in the service of George W. Bush's regime, the George Lakoff framing technology that was all the rage a few years ago, the new adaptation of neuroscience to 'neuropolitics' laid out by Drew Westen, David Plouffe's methodical review of the use of polling and particularly focus groups in the Audacity to Win, or the most recent celebration of big data and the science lab in the constant experimentation of the most recent Obama success, it is clear that something is very different today.

The most recent presidential campaign in the United States cost some \$11 billion, much of that devoted to research and advertising. It would be very interesting to compare the relative dollars spent on political marketing versus policy research over the past generation. My guess is that there has been a dramatic shift in favour of the tools of persuasion and manipulation which may not have served the public interest. While one can question the value of a political world immersed in nonstop campaigning to better sell candidates and policies, this new battle mode seems to have produced even less savoury abuses in the form of the marriage of new information technologies to vote suppression and an expansion of the ethical boundaries of political practice into areas that would have been deemed unthinkable even a decade ago.

In Canada in 2006, the federal government spent roughly the same amount of money on polling as it did advertising (I declare a major self-interest on this point). Polling for the federal government is non-partisan and designed to solicit the feedback of citizens and clients for government on programs and policies. Advertising is also supposed to be non-partisan and is intended to explain or communicate.

Cynics suggest that advertising is now more partisan in nature and is designed to persuade and comfort the public. Note, for example, the continuing federal advertising on Canada's Economic Action Plan. This program was a major one-time stimulus plan introduced in the aftermath of the economic meltdown of 2008. It was completed with a final report in 2012. Recognizing the success of the advertising and the comforting image it gave about government vigilance on the economy, a vastly smaller program which has little bearing to the original plan continues to be a cornerstone of government advertising. Although the numbers are difficult to precisely nail down, it is clear that the federal government now spends somewhere between ten and twenty times as much on advertising as it does on "listening to Canadians".

This dramatic shift from parity of polling and advertising is a fairly minor example of the shift from concerns with policy and engagement to concerns with persuasion and branding. Policy research has dropped dramatically in the Government of Canada as Alan Gregg and others have noted under the rubric of assault on reason. This is not unique to Canada and the shift from pursuit of rational public policy to massive investments in political marketing to cajole and persuade is our final main year end force. It is also quite likely the case that the boundaries between the state and the government of the day have become increasingly blurry in this new era.

This massive shift from policy to political marketing technology may not be the cause of the current depths of public trust in government and political parties, but it sure hasn't helped.

Detailed Tables

Long-Term Financial Outlook						
<i>Q. Thinking ahead over the next five years or so, do you think your personal financial situation will be better or worse than it is today?</i>						
	Worse (1-3)	The Same (4)	Better (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	29%	33%	34%	4%	5433	1.3
REGION						
British Columbia	32%	32%	35%	2%	570	4.1
Alberta	20%	30%	41%	8%	469	4.5
Saskatchewan	24%	27%	37%	12%	254	6.2
Manitoba	25%	29%	36%	11%	222	6.6
Ontario	28%	34%	36%	2%	1694	2.4
Quebec	33%	36%	28%	3%	1883	2.3
Atlantic Canada	32%	32%	33%	3%	328	5.4
GENDER						
Male	29%	31%	39%	1%	2530	2
Female	30%	37%	31%	1%	2743	1.9
AGE						
<25	31%	19%	48%	3%	260	6.1
25-44	25%	27%	47%	2%	1439	2.6
45-64	33%	36%	29%	1%	2166	2.1
65+	29%	54%	16%	1%	1402	2.6
EDUCATION						
High school or less	34%	37%	27%	1%	1723	2.4
College or CEGEP	31%	33%	35%	1%	1695	2.4
University or higher	24%	33%	42%	2%	1837	2.3
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	19%	34%	45%	1%	1384	2.6
NDP	34%	34%	31%	1%	1128	2.9
Liberal Party	29%	38%	32%	1%	1169	2.9
Green Party	33%	28%	37%	2%	325	5.4
Bloc Quebecois	37%	33%	29%	1%	431	4.7
Other	44%	18%	37%	1%	111	9.3



Most Important Issue for Discussion

Q. Which of the following do you think should be the most important issue in discussions about Canada's future? Should it be: 1) social issues like health and education; 2) issues related to the economy like economic growth and jobs; 3) Fiscal issues like taxes and debt; 4) Issues such as the growing gap between rich and poor; or 5) none of these?

	Social issues	Economic issues	Fiscal issues	Income inequality	Don't know/None of the these	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	24%	26%	9%	31%	9%	3699	1.6
REGION							
British Columbia	26%	24%	8%	34%	7%	678	3.8
Alberta	26%	23%	14%	28%	8%	461	4.6
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	26%	21%	10%	32%	11%	229	6.5
Ontario	21%	32%	9%	30%	9%	821	3.4
Quebec	28%	20%	9%	31%	11%	960	3.2
Atlantic Canada	24%	27%	9%	32%	9%	550	4.2
GENDER							
Male	19%	29%	12%	32%	8%	1750	2.3
Female	30%	23%	7%	30%	10%	1949	2.2
AGE							
<25	31%	27%	9%	24%	9%	207	6.8
25-44	25%	24%	10%	31%	9%	932	3.2
45-64	21%	27%	10%	34%	9%	1464	2.6
65+	25%	27%	8%	29%	10%	1096	3.0
EDUCATION							
High school or less	23%	25%	10%	30%	11%	1188	2.8
College or CEGEP	25%	25%	9%	32%	9%	1253	2.8
University or higher	25%	28%	9%	30%	8%	1258	2.8
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party of Canada	16%	40%	16%	22%	6%	1069	3.0
NDP	29%	18%	6%	39%	8%	916	3.2
Liberal Party of Canada	25%	30%	8%	30%	7%	694	3.7
Green Party	28%	16%	3%	42%	10%	220	6.6
Bloc Quebecois	35%	10%	7%	36%	13%	196	7.0
Other	26%	19%	9%	31%	14%	94	10.1
Undecided	29%	18%	8%	26%	19%	432	4.7



Self-Rated Social Class

Q. Would you describe you and your household as poor, working class, middle class or upper class?

	Poor	Working class	Middle class	Upper class	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	12%	32%	48%	5%	4%	5433	1.3
REGION							
British Columbia	15%	34%	46%	4%	1%	570	4.1
Alberta	7%	33%	48%	5%	7%	469	4.5
Saskatchewan	10%	32%	41%	4%	13%	254	6.2
Manitoba	10%	35%	41%	3%	11%	222	6.6
Ontario	11%	33%	49%	4%	2%	1694	2.4
Quebec	13%	27%	52%	7%	2%	1883	2.3
Atlantic Canada	13%	39%	41%	4%	3%	328	5.4
GENDER							
Male	11%	31%	52%	6%	1%	2530	2.0
Female	13%	35%	47%	4%	1%	2743	1.9
AGE							
<25	15%	30%	46%	7%	2%	260	6.1
25-44	11%	34%	49%	5%	1%	1439	2.6
45-64	12%	35%	47%	5%	1%	2166	2.1
65+	11%	29%	56%	4%	1%	1402	2.6
EDUCATION							
High school or less	20%	42%	34%	4%	1%	1723	2.4
College or CEGEP	12%	40%	44%	3%	1%	1695	2.4
University or higher	5%	18%	68%	8%	1%	1837	2.3
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party	7%	31%	56%	5%	1%	1384	2.6
NDP	13%	33%	49%	4%	1%	1128	2.9
Liberal Party	9%	30%	53%	7%	1%	1169	2.9
Green Party	17%	33%	45%	5%	0%	325	5.4
Bloc Quebecois	15%	23%	56%	6%	0%	431	4.7
Other	21%	41%	31%	6%	2%	111	9.3



Change in Well-Being of CEOs of large companies

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?

CEOs of large companies

	Fallen Behind (1-2)	Stayed the same (3)	Moved ahead (4-5)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	3%	5%	89%	2%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	2%	7%	91%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	1%	9%	91%	0%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	0%	3%	94%	3%	35	16.6
Manitoba	3%	2%	91%	5%	41	15.3
Ontario	2%	3%	93%	2%	509	4.3
Quebec	9%	8%	78%	4%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	1%	5%	92%	2%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	2%	4%	92%	2%	688	3.7
Female	4%	7%	85%	3%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	6%	5%	87%	2%	73	11.5
25-44	3%	9%	86%	2%	387	5.0
45-64	3%	4%	91%	3%	501	4.4
65+	2%	2%	94%	3%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	3%	7%	84%	6%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	4%	5%	90%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	3%	4%	91%	2%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	2%	7%	90%	3%	334	5.4
NDP	4%	5%	90%	1%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	3%	4%	90%	1%	250	6.2
Green Party	3%	3%	94%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	9%	11%	76%	4%	49	14.0
Other	0%	0%	95%	5%	16	24.5



Change in Well-Being of Banking and Financial Services Employees

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?

Those who work in the banking and financial services sector

	Fallen Behind (1-2)	Stayed the same (3)	Moved ahead (4-5)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	9%	24%	63%	5%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	9%	28%	60%	3%	141	8.3
Alberta	6%	29%	62%	3%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	2%	14%	79%	5%	35	16.6
Manitoba	5%	40%	52%	3%	41	15.3
Ontario	7%	22%	65%	5%	509	4.3
Quebec	13%	22%	58%	7%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	5%	21%	69%	5%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	8%	23%	66%	3%	688	3.7
Female	9%	25%	59%	7%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	5%	22%	69%	4%	73	11.5
25-44	9%	25%	62%	4%	387	5.0
45-64	9%	25%	60%	6%	501	4.4
65+	5%	24%	66%	6%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	8%	25%	60%	7%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	10%	26%	60%	4%	429	4.7
University or higher	7%	22%	67%	4%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	6%	28%	64%	3%	334	5.4
NDP	8%	23%	65%	5%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	10%	23%	62%	5%	250	6.2
Green Party	7%	20%	73%	1%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	12%	23%	63%	2%	49	14.0
Other	9%	20%	66%	5%	16	24.5



Change in Well-Being of Public Sector Employees

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?

Those who work in the public sector

	Fallen Behind (1-2)	Stayed the same (3)	Moved ahead (4-5)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	26%	30%	40%	3%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	36%	24%	39%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	31%	30%	37%	3%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	23%	35%	40%	3%	35	16.6
Manitoba	29%	35%	31%	5%	41	15.3
Ontario	24%	29%	44%	3%	509	4.3
Quebec	22%	32%	43%	4%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	33%	38%	25%	5%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	24%	30%	44%	2%	688	3.7
Female	29%	31%	36%	5%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	26%	37%	32%	5%	73	11.5
25-44	28%	31%	37%	4%	387	5.0
45-64	25%	30%	43%	2%	501	4.4
65+	22%	23%	52%	3%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	24%	30%	38%	8%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	26%	30%	44%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	28%	31%	38%	3%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	12%	29%	57%	3%	334	5.4
NDP	40%	29%	29%	2%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	27%	30%	40%	3%	250	6.2
Green Party	26%	38%	36%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	23%	34%	41%	2%	49	14.0
Other	26%	42%	27%	5%	16	24.5



Change in Well-Being of Manual and Blue Collar Workers

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?

Manual and Blue Collar Workers

	Fallen Behind (1-2)	Stayed the same (3)	Moved ahead (4-5)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	56%	24%	18%	3%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	70%	18%	10%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	48%	30%	21%	1%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	59%	20%	19%	3%	35	16.6
Manitoba	46%	26%	23%	5%	41	15.3
Ontario	66%	21%	11%	2%	509	4.3
Quebec	31%	31%	32%	6%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	68%	19%	11%	3%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	59%	24%	15%	2%	688	3.7
Female	52%	24%	20%	4%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	59%	21%	13%	7%	73	11.5
25-44	50%	25%	23%	2%	387	5.0
45-64	61%	23%	14%	2%	501	4.4
65+	50%	31%	15%	4%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	50%	27%	16%	6%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	58%	26%	15%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	57%	20%	21%	2%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	47%	32%	20%	2%	334	5.4
NDP	63%	20%	14%	3%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	62%	19%	16%	3%	250	6.2
Green Party	68%	16%	15%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	38%	35%	27%	0%	49	14.0
Other	54%	9%	32%	5%	16	24.5



Change in Well-Being of Middle Class Households

Q. Do you believe the following groups have moved ahead, fallen behind, or stayed the same over the last 25 years?

Middle class households

	Fallen Behind (1-2)	Stayed the same (3)	Moved ahead (4-5)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	70%	21%	8%	2%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	77%	15%	7%	2%	141	8.3
Alberta	62%	27%	11%	0%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	59%	25%	11%	5%	35	16.6
Manitoba	65%	27%	5%	3%	41	15.3
Ontario	72%	20%	7%	2%	509	4.3
Quebec	69%	19%	9%	3%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	65%	26%	6%	3%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	69%	24%	6%	1%	688	3.7
Female	71%	17%	9%	3%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	70%	22%	6%	2%	73	11.5
25-44	67%	21%	10%	2%	387	5.0
45-64	73%	20%	5%	2%	501	4.4
65+	66%	23%	9%	2%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	65%	21%	9%	5%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	74%	21%	6%	0%	429	4.7
University or higher	69%	21%	9%	2%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	55%	31%	13%	1%	334	5.4
NDP	82%	13%	4%	1%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	73%	21%	5%	2%	250	6.2
Green Party	75%	19%	5%	1%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	77%	14%	8%	2%	49	14.0
Other	74%	9%	12%	5%	16	24.5



Impact of Inequality on Work Ethic

Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The growing concentration of wealth among the richest Canadians has a strong demotivating effect on others to work hard and apply their best efforts."

	Disagree (1-3)	Neither (4)	Agree (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	29%	33%	33%	6%	5433	1.3
REGION						
British Columbia	35%	30%	31%	4%	570	4.1
Alberta	30%	34%	26%	10%	469	4.5
Saskatchewan	25%	34%	26%	16%	254	6.2
Manitoba	29%	32%	28%	11%	222	6.6
Ontario	32%	31%	33%	4%	1694	2.4
Quebec	21%	34%	39%	6%	1883	2.3
Atlantic Canada	26%	39%	29%	6%	328	5.4
GENDER						
Male	33%	30%	36%	2%	2530	2.0
Female	27%	37%	32%	5%	2743	1.9
AGE						
<25	33%	28%	34%	5%	260	6.1
25-44	30%	29%	37%	4%	1439	2.6
45-64	29%	35%	33%	3%	2166	2.1
65+	26%	42%	30%	2%	1402	2.6
EDUCATION						
High school or less	28%	41%	28%	3%	1723	2.4
College or CEGEP	27%	33%	35%	5%	1695	2.4
University or higher	32%	27%	38%	3%	1837	2.3
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	38%	34%	26%	2%	1384	2.6
NDP	26%	30%	40%	4%	1128	2.9
Liberal Party	30%	35%	33%	3%	1169	2.9
Green Party	27%	29%	41%	3%	325	5.4
Bloc Quebecois	19%	31%	46%	4%	431	4.7
Other	29%	33%	35%	3%	111	9.3


Perceived Changes in Quality of Life Over Time (25 years ago)

Q. Thinking about your overall quality of life, would you say that you are better off, worse off, or about the same as the previous generation was 25 years ago?

	Better off	About the same	Worse off	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	34%	29%	37%	1844	2.3
REGION					
British Columbia	32%	28%	40%	319	5.5
Alberta	41%	28%	31%	229	6.5
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	40%	29%	31%	109	9.4
Ontario	34%	27%	38%	418	4.8
Quebec	29%	35%	36%	476	4.5
Atlantic Canada	38%	25%	37%	293	5.7
GENDER					
Male	33%	28%	39%	880	3.3
Female	35%	31%	35%	964	3.2
AGE					
<25	37%	26%	37%	106	9.5
25-44	29%	26%	45%	450	4.6
45-64	35%	29%	37%	728	3.6
65+	41%	38%	21%	560	4.1
EDUCATION					
High school or less	30%	32%	37%	611	4.0
College or CEGEP	33%	29%	38%	611	4.0
University or higher	38%	27%	35%	622	3.9
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION					
Conservative Party of Canada	50%	28%	22%	562	4.1
NDP	29%	28%	43%	432	4.7
Liberal Party of Canada	35%	30%	36%	342	5.3
Green Party	15%	34%	51%	113	9.2
Bloc Quebecois	21%	42%	37%	88	10.5
Other	28%	24%	47%	48	14.1
Undecided	26%	29%	45%	223	6.6


Perceived Changes in Quality of Life Over Time (25 years from now)

Q. Thinking about your overall quality of life do you think the next generation will be better off, worse off, or about the same as you are 25 years from now?

	Better off	About the same	Worse off	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	14%	29%	57%	1855	2.3
REGION					
British Columbia	14%	24%	63%	359	5.2
Alberta	11%	29%	60%	232	6.4
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	16%	32%	52%	120	9.0
Ontario	15%	27%	57%	403	4.9
Quebec	13%	35%	52%	484	4.5
Atlantic Canada	14%	28%	58%	257	6.1
GENDER					
Male	16%	30%	54%	870	3.3
Female	13%	29%	59%	985	3.1
AGE					
<25	20%	21%	59%	101	9.8
25-44	14%	27%	59%	482	4.5
45-64	13%	29%	58%	736	3.6
65+	12%	40%	48%	536	4.2
EDUCATION					
High school or less	16%	31%	53%	577	4.1
College or CEGEP	14%	25%	60%	642	3.9
University or higher	12%	32%	56%	636	3.9
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION					
Conservative Party of Canada	19%	36%	45%	507	4.4
Liberal Party of Canada	16%	29%	56%	352	5.2
NDP	11%	26%	62%	484	4.5
Green Party	11%	20%	69%	107	9.5
Bloc Quebecois	5%	27%	67%	108	9.4
Other	18%	12%	70%	46	14.5
Undecided	8%	30%	62%	209	6.8



Political Ideology

Q. Forgetting about your current party choice, do you consider yourself a small "l" liberal or a small "c" conservative? Note: This question refers to overall political beliefs or ideology, not support for political parties

	Liberal (1-3)	Neither (4)	Conservative (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	48%	22%	25%	6%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	56%	16%	24%	4%	141	8.3
Alberta	45%	16%	35%	5%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	56%	11%	31%	3%	35	16.6
Manitoba	36%	26%	28%	10%	41	15.3
Ontario	49%	17%	29%	6%	509	4.3
Quebec	47%	37%	13%	4%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	41%	19%	29%	11%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	47%	21%	29%	4%	688	3.7
Female	49%	23%	21%	7%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	65%	18%	14%	4%	73	11.5
25-44	48%	23%	23%	7%	387	5.0
45-64	46%	21%	28%	5%	501	4.4
65+	39%	22%	37%	3%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	36%	29%	26%	9%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	39%	26%	30%	6%	429	4.7
University or higher	63%	13%	21%	3%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	10%	14%	73%	3%	334	5.4
NDP	71%	20%	6%	4%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	77%	13%	7%	4%	250	6.2
Green Party	62%	24%	10%	3%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	34%	52%	13%	1%	49	14.0
Other	10%	48%	32%	10%	16	24.5



Perceived Treatment of Older versus Younger Canada

Q. About half of Canada's population, younger Canada, is under the age of 42, while the other half, older Canada, is over 42. Do you think the Government of Canada focuses more on the values and interests of younger Canada or older Canada?

	Those under the age of 42	Those 42 and over	Both are treated equally	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	24%	39%	21%	16%	3699	1.6
REGION						
British Columbia	20%	40%	20%	20%	678	3.8
Alberta	24%	39%	21%	16%	461	4.6
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	30%	34%	19%	17%	229	6.5
Ontario	27%	38%	21%	13%	821	3.4
Quebec	20%	41%	22%	17%	960	3.2
Atlantic Canada	30%	35%	16%	19%	550	4.2
GENDER						
Male	22%	41%	23%	13%	1750	2.3
Female	26%	36%	19%	18%	1949	2.2
AGE						
<25	31%	46%	12%	11%	207	6.8
25-44	18%	52%	17%	13%	932	3.2
45-64	28%	29%	25%	17%	1464	2.6
65+	26%	24%	26%	24%	1096	3.0
EDUCATION						
High school or less	29%	31%	20%	19%	1188	2.8
College or CEGEP	26%	37%	21%	16%	1253	2.8
University or higher	18%	47%	22%	13%	1258	2.8
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party of Canada	26%	31%	29%	14%	1069	3.0
Liberal Party of Canada	21%	49%	18%	12%	694	3.7
NDP	25%	42%	17%	16%	916	3.2
Green Party	21%	50%	17%	12%	220	6.6
Bloc Quebecois	23%	43%	16%	18%	196	7.0
Other	34%	33%	20%	13%	94	10.1
Undecided	21%	30%	20%	29%	432	4.7



Role of Social Media in Democracy

Q. As you know, the use of social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter has increased dramatically in recent years. Some people argue that social media is good for democracy since it offers new ways of participating in politics and communicating with the public. Other people argue that social networking is harmful to democracy, since many people will use these websites as a substitute for real world action. Which of these statements comes closest to your own point of view?

	Social media is good for democracy	Social media is harmful to democracy	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	62%	17%	21%	2005	2.2
REGION					
British Columbia	67%	14%	19%	262	6.1
Alberta	69%	14%	17%	207	6.8
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	60%	13%	27%	130	8.6
Ontario	64%	14%	22%	873	3.3
Quebec	56%	24%	20%	420	4.8
Atlantic Canada	56%	21%	23%	113	9.2
GENDER					
Male	63%	18%	20%	1051	3.0
Female	62%	16%	22%	893	3.3
AGE					
<25	73%	14%	13%	218	6.6
25-44	68%	14%	19%	634	3.9
45-64	59%	18%	23%	727	3.6
65+	51%	22%	27%	370	5.1
EDUCATION					
High school or less	49%	22%	29%	314	5.5
College or CEGEP	57%	20%	23%	627	3.9
University or higher	70%	13%	17%	1046	3.0
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION					
Conservative Party	53%	23%	24%	625	3.9
NDP	69%	13%	18%	541	4.2
Liberal Party	71%	12%	17%	492	4.4
Green Party	55%	27%	18%	108	9.4
Bloc Quebecois	68%	11%	21%	114	9.2
Other	47%	20%	33%	28	18.5
Undecided	43%	14%	43%	87	10.5


Most Important Goals and Values (Mean Value): 1/2

Q. If you were to direct Canadian Society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be? Please rate your response on a scale from 0, not at all important, to 100, the highest possible importance, with 50 being moderately important.

	Freedom	Integrity and ethics	A healthy population	Collective human rights	A clean environment	Security and safety	Tolerance
NATIONALLY	87	86	85	83	83	78	77
REGION							
British Columbia	90	91	89	84	86	75	80
Alberta	88	85	81	81	79	79	75
Saskatchewan	86	86	85	79	81	81	77
Manitoba	87	85	87	76	83	82	74
Ontario	88	87	84	83	83	79	77
Quebec	84	81	87	84	83	76	74
Atlantic Canada	88	86	84	82	80	80	77
GENDER							
Male	87	86	84	80	81	75	75
Female	87	86	86	86	84	81	79
AGE							
<25	86	84	84	90	84	69	80
25-44	85	83	83	81	82	75	75
45-64	89	89	86	82	83	83	76
65+	91	89	89	79	82	84	81
EDUCATION							
High school or less	87	84	85	83	81	82	78
College or CEGEP	90	86	85	82	83	80	73
University or higher	85	87	85	83	84	74	80
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party of Canada	90	87	83	75	74	85	70
NDP	86	88	88	89	88	75	83
Liberal Party of Canada	87	84	86	83	84	78	79
Green Party	86	86	84	86	90	71	80
Bloc Quebecois	80	76	83	81	82	73	73
Other	95	90	82	83	84	46	71


Most Important Goals and Values (Mean Value): 2/2

Q. If you were to direct Canadian Society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be? Please rate your response on a scale from 0, not at all important, to 100, the highest possible importance, with 50 being moderately important.

	Social equality	Hard work	Sharing of wealth	Prosperity and wealth	Respect for authority	Traditional family values	Minimal government intrusions
NATIONALLY	77	77	69	66	65	60	57
REGION							
British Columbia	80	80	68	63	58	53	61
Alberta	73	82	63	65	68	63	60
Saskatchewan	73	75	72	62	74	65	50
Manitoba	74	81	68	70	69	66	57
Ontario	77	79	68	68	64	58	57
Quebec	77	65	74	64	66	65	53
Atlantic Canada	78	84	67	66	72	67	62
GENDER							
Male	73	78	66	69	63	57	58
Female	81	75	73	62	67	64	55
AGE							
<25	82	71	72	63	50	44	43
25-44	75	74	68	65	63	55	55
45-64	77	80	69	67	70	68	62
65+	75	80	67	66	75	72	59
EDUCATION							
High school or less	77	77	70	65	70	68	62
College or CEGEP	77	79	68	67	69	69	63
University or higher	76	74	69	65	58	48	48
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party of Canada	66	85	53	70	75	75	70
NDP	85	73	79	62	58	50	47
Liberal Party of Canada	78	78	69	68	66	59	54
Green Party	80	73	73	56	53	41	53
Bloc Quebecois	76	57	81	58	63	66	48
Other	62	73	66	63	34	49	85


Personal Sense of Belonging: Family

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...?

Your family

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	5%	6%	88%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	5%	5%	90%	0%	141	8.3
Alberta	1%	7%	91%	1%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	2%	10%	88%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	10%	8%	82%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	6%	5%	88%	1%	509	4.3
Quebec	5%	7%	86%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	5%	2%	94%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	5%	8%	86%	1%	688	3.7
Female	5%	4%	91%	0%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	7%	7%	87%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	5%	6%	89%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	5%	6%	88%	0%	501	4.4
65+	5%	4%	90%	1%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	5%	5%	88%	2%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	5%	6%	89%	0%	429	4.7
University or higher	5%	7%	88%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	4%	4%	92%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	6%	6%	88%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	5%	6%	88%	1%	250	6.2
Green Party	6%	9%	85%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	8%	4%	88%	0%	49	14.0
Other	6%	0%	89%	5%	16	24.5


Personal Sense of Belonging: Canada
Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...?
Canada

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	13%	12%	74%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	9%	10%	81%	0%	141	8.3
Alberta	5%	6%	88%	2%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	3%	6%	91%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	8%	7%	85%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	6%	9%	85%	0%	509	4.3
Quebec	37%	23%	38%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	6%	8%	86%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	15%	9%	75%	1%	688	3.7
Female	11%	15%	73%	1%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	15%	14%	72%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	20%	13%	67%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	8%	11%	80%	1%	501	4.4
65+	7%	8%	86%	0%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	11%	9%	78%	2%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	15%	14%	71%	0%	429	4.7
University or higher	13%	12%	75%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	6%	7%	87%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	17%	11%	72%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	6%	12%	82%	1%	250	6.2
Green Party	4%	16%	80%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	64%	29%	7%	0%	49	14.0
Other	23%	5%	68%	5%	16	24.5


Personal Sense of Belonging: Province
Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...?
Province

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	18%	21%	60%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	18%	22%	59%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	16%	18%	65%	1%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	9%	6%	85%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	14%	23%	64%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	25%	26%	48%	0%	509	4.3
Quebec	12%	17%	70%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	8%	13%	79%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	20%	20%	60%	1%	688	3.7
Female	17%	22%	61%	0%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	21%	25%	54%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	23%	19%	58%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	15%	21%	64%	1%	501	4.4
65+	11%	23%	66%	0%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	15%	17%	67%	1%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	18%	22%	59%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	21%	22%	57%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	15%	22%	63%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	19%	19%	62%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	21%	22%	57%	0%	250	6.2
Green Party	22%	29%	49%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	8%	11%	81%	0%	49	14.0
Other	22%	24%	49%	5%	16	24.5

Personal Sense of Belonging: Ethnic Group or National Ancestry

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...?

Ethnic group or national ancestry

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	32%	23%	43%	2%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	47%	19%	33%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	42%	19%	36%	2%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	44%	18%	39%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	37%	31%	32%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	33%	25%	40%	2%	509	4.3
Quebec	16%	22%	59%	2%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	32%	17%	49%	3%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	35%	22%	40%	2%	688	3.7
Female	29%	23%	47%	1%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	33%	20%	43%	4%	73	11.5
25-44	33%	22%	44%	2%	387	5.0
45-64	31%	25%	44%	1%	501	4.4
65+	32%	23%	43%	2%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	31%	21%	44%	4%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	27%	28%	44%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	37%	19%	42%	1%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	29%	26%	44%	1%	334	5.4
NDP	38%	22%	39%	2%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	30%	22%	46%	2%	250	6.2
Green Party	46%	22%	32%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	18%	16%	66%	0%	49	14.0
Other	53%	19%	23%	5%	16	24.5



Trust in Government

Q. How much do you trust the government in Ottawa to do what is right?

	Almost always	Most of the time	Some of the time	Almost never	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	8%	27%	37%	24%	4%	5433	1.3
REGION							
British Columbia	9%	25%	36%	28%	2%	570	4.1
Alberta	9%	36%	32%	15%	9%	469	4.5
Saskatchewan	9%	27%	36%	15%	13%	254	6.2
Manitoba	14%	23%	36%	15%	12%	222	6.6
Ontario	9%	31%	37%	22%	2%	1694	2.4
Quebec	5%	21%	40%	32%	2%	1883	2.3
Atlantic Canada	6%	23%	41%	27%	3%	328	5.4
GENDER							
Male	10%	29%	36%	24%	1%	2530	2.0
Female	7%	27%	40%	25%	2%	2743	1.9
AGE							
<25	16%	24%	33%	24%	3%	260	6.1
25-44	5%	30%	38%	25%	2%	1439	2.6
45-64	7%	25%	40%	27%	1%	2166	2.1
65+	10%	32%	38%	19%	1%	1402	2.6
EDUCATION							
High school or less	10%	28%	37%	23%	1%	1723	2.4
College or CEGEP	7%	28%	40%	24%	1%	1695	2.4
University or higher	7%	28%	37%	26%	2%	1837	2.3
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party	17%	52%	25%	5%	1%	1384	2.6
NDP	3%	16%	44%	36%	1%	1128	2.9
Liberal Party	5%	23%	45%	26%	1%	1169	2.9
Green Party	6%	17%	44%	32%	1%	325	5.4
Bloc Quebecois	2%	11%	40%	47%	0%	431	4.7
Other	4%	13%	34%	48%	2%	111	9.3



Use of Social Media

Q. How often do you use the following?

Social networking website, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn

	Never	Once or twice a month	About once a week	Several days a week	Daily or almost daily	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	25%	12%	10%	11%	42%	0%	2891	1.8
REGION								
British Columbia	28%	14%	9%	12%	37%	0%	348	5.3
Alberta	26%	16%	10%	11%	36%	0%	670	3.8
Saskatchewan/Manitoba	39%	11%	10%	12%	27%	1%	176	7.4
Ontario	24%	12%	11%	9%	43%	0%	1080	3.0
Quebec	24%	10%	10%	12%	43%	1%	477	4.5
Atlantic Canada	21%	8%	4%	11%	57%	0%	140	8.3
GENDER								
Male	30%	14%	11%	10%	35%	1%	1596	2.5
Female	21%	11%	8%	11%	48%	0%	1295	2.7
AGE								
<35	7%	6%	6%	12%	69%	0%	471	4.5
35-54	20%	14%	11%	12%	42%	0%	1182	2.9
55-64	39%	15%	11%	11%	24%	0%	629	3.9
65+	54%	16%	10%	7%	12%	0%	511	4.3
INCOME								
<\$40K	20%	10%	8%	12%	50%	0%	685	3.7
\$40-79K	26%	13%	10%	10%	41%	0%	959	3.2
\$80K+	28%	15%	12%	12%	33%	0%	810	3.4
EDUCATION								
High school or less	23%	10%	8%	7%	50%	0%	263	6.0
College or CEGEP	24%	11%	10%	11%	43%	0%	1126	2.9
University or higher	27%	13%	10%	11%	39%	0%	1481	2.6
LABOUR FORCE STATUS								
Self-employed	27%	14%	12%	10%	36%	1%	402	4.9
Employed full-time	21%	13%	11%	12%	43%	0%	1174	2.9
Employed part-time	17%	12%	13%	9%	49%	0%	157	7.8
Unemployed	17%	11%	6%	11%	55%	1%	104	9.6

Perceived Health of Democracy

Q. How would you rate the overall health of democracy at the federal level in Canada?

	Unhealthy (1-3)	Neither (4)	Health (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	34%	28%	33%	5%	5433	1.3
REGION						
British Columbia	40%	27%	30%	3%	570	4.1
Alberta	28%	23%	39%	10%	469	4.5
Saskatchewan	27%	27%	33%	14%	254	6.2
Manitoba	28%	31%	30%	11%	222	6.6
Ontario	33%	26%	38%	3%	1694	2.4
Quebec	37%	33%	27%	3%	1883	2.3
Atlantic Canada	35%	32%	28%	4%	328	5.4
GENDER						
Male	38%	23%	38%	2%	2530	2.0
Female	32%	35%	30%	3%	2743	1.9
AGE						
<25	35%	24%	38%	3%	260	6.1
25-44	37%	26%	35%	3%	1439	2.6
45-64	36%	30%	32%	2%	2166	2.1
65+	28%	35%	35%	2%	1402	2.6
EDUCATION						
High school or less	29%	37%	31%	3%	1723	2.4
College or CEGEP	33%	31%	34%	3%	1695	2.4
University or higher	42%	20%	37%	2%	1837	2.3
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	14%	22%	62%	2%	1384	2.6
NDP	48%	29%	20%	2%	1128	2.9
Liberal Party	40%	28%	30%	2%	1169	2.9
Green Party	49%	27%	23%	2%	325	5.4
Bloc Quebecois	45%	34%	20%	2%	431	4.7
Other	42%	31%	26%	1%	111	9.3

Methodology

This series draws on data collected from **five separate surveys**. Two of these surveys used Interactive Voice Response (IVR) technology, which allows respondents to enter their preferences by punching the keypad on their phone, rather than telling them to an operator.

In an effort to reduce the coverage bias of landline only RDD, we created a dual landline/cell phone RDD sampling frame for this research. As a result, we are able to reach those with a landline and cell phone, as well as cell phone only households and landline only households. This dual frame yields a near perfect unweighted distribution on age group and gender, something almost never seen with traditional landline RDD sample or interviewer-administered surveys. This methodology is not to be confused with the increasing proliferation of non-probability opt-in online panels which have recently been incorrectly reported in major national media with inappropriate margin of error estimates.

The field dates for the **first survey** are February 21-28, 2012. In total, a random sample of 3,699 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.6 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **second survey** are November 20 – December 3, 2012. In total, a random sample of 5,433 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey (including a sub-sample of 4,548 decided and leaning voters). The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.3 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The three remaining surveys were conducted exclusively online using EKOS' unique, hybrid online/telephone research panel, *Probit*. Our panel offers exhaustive coverage of the Canadian population (i.e., Internet, phone, cell phone), random recruitment (in other words, participants are recruited randomly, they do not opt themselves into our panel), and equal probability sampling. All respondents to our panel are recruited by telephone using random digit dialling and are confirmed by live interviewers. Unlike opt-in online panels, *Probit* supports margin of error estimates. We believe this to be the only probability-based online panel in Canada.

The field dates for the **third survey** are December 14-21, 2011. In total, 2,005 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-2.2 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **fourth survey** are January 27 – February 8, 2012. In total, 2,891 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.8 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **fifth survey** are November 20-29, 2012. In total, 1,181 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-2.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.


Please note that the margin of error increases when the results are sub-divided (i.e., error margins for sub-groups such as region, sex, age, education). All the data have been statistically weighted to ensure the samples composition reflects that of the actual population of Canada according to Census data.

Annex 1: Social Media, Socioeconomic Status, and Democratic Health

In an earlier discussion on social media, we discussed its linkage to democratic health and to socioeconomic status (SES) – i.e., income and educational attainment. We provide two additional pieces of background evidence. The first doesn't directly link social media and democratic health but it does show the recent trend lines in how Canadians rate the health of democracy. The trend line is not auspicious and shows that a much longer decline in trust in government, which is pervasive to the advanced western world and began in the eighties, is not improving. This decline in trust is actually linked to some of the broader values shifts we will be discussing in our release later today (less deference, less respect for authority and traditional values). The tracking over the past few years is presented in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2: Perceived health of democracy

Q. How would you rate the overall health of democracy at the federal level in Canada?



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BASE: Canadians; most recent data point November 20 – December 3, 2012 (n=5,433)


We have gone from a modest plurality rating the health of federal democracy positively in the spring of 2009 to a mere one-third minority today. These highly polarized views are dramatically split across whether one supports the government of the day or not (in a predictable manner). Less predictably, positive trust is restricted largely to senior Canada¹⁰ and is pretty low in all other age groups. University graduates are much less trusting, as are residents of provinces other than Alberta.

¹⁰ Nevitte, Neil, "The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Comparative Perspective 1981-1990", Toronto: Broadview Press, 1996. Print.

The second addendum looks a little more closely at the linkage between social media consumption and socioeconomic status (income and educational attainment) and how well one is faring it the labour market. We have to be cautious in not mixing up the effects of age where social media consumption is most focused in younger Canada who are also more prone to labour market problems these days. While some of these effects are accounted for by age, there is an important additional effect which is associated with social media consumption.

Figure 3-3: Social media use

Q. How often do you use the following: Social networking website, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn?



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BASE: Canadians; January 27 – February 8, 2012 (n=1,091)

Historically, there has been a strong positive correlation between Internet consumption and SES. The more affluent and educated were far more likely to be frequent Internet users. In the case of social media, this relationship is no longer the case and there may even be a negative correlation between heavy consumption of social media and SES. It is also the case that the most avid daily users of social media are faring more poorly in the labour market. They are less likely to be employed at all and, if they are, they may be in poorer jobs which, for example, are less likely to pay overtime. These relationships are modest but interesting as they seem to be reversing the direction of the 'digital divide' of a decade ago which saw a positive linkage between Internet consumption, SES, and labour force outcomes.

So as in the case of both the economy and democracy, we may want to curb our enthusiasm on the uncritical view that social media are purely positive forces. To adapt a famous skeptical note



from Robert Solow (referring to computers), you can see social media everywhere, except in the productivity statistics.