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LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING FORWARD: PART 4

FORCE FOUR: VALUES SLOWLY SHIFTING AWAY FROM RIGHT AS GOVERNMENT DOES OPPOSITE


[Ottawa – January 4, 2013] As we have already recently developed this theme, we will not review it in depth but we will comment more on its implications and connections to some of the other forces. We believe that this force merits discussion for two reasons. First, values are the crucial normative goalposts which define a society and should shape its direction. They reflect what citizens see as right and wrong and what kind of society they would like to hand off to the next generation, how they would like their society to be seen by the external world. When values do shift – and they move at a glacial pace – it is very important. Unlike more mercurial opinions and attitudes, values constitute a moral charter which underpins a society's trajectory. Their importance to national governments is obvious.

Secondly, we believe that there are some huge gaps and distortions in our understanding of national values and how these have been changing. In particular, the claim that Canada is blueing or shifting to the right has been offered as both a genuine measure of value change and as legitimization for further movements in national policy in that direction.

The idea that there can be a consensual, consistent set of values framing a pluralistic society such as Canada is a chimera. Many contradictory values are held tenaciously which leave little room for central terrain (e.g. right to life, right to choose, capital punishment/abolition, gun control, right to bear arms). It is also the case that many core values are not divisive ideologically (e.g. freedom, respect) and most Canadians hold positive views of both small-c conservative values and small-l liberal values.

Figure 4-1: Most important goals and values

Q. If you were to direct Canadian society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be?



With these important caveats in mind, let me state clearly that there is virtually no plausible evidence in place to suggest that Canada is shifting to the right on social values. The success of parties of the right is not a product of a rightward shift nor is the presence of a right of centre party in Ottawa moving the public to the right. In reality, the factors that are moving values are far deeper and transnational than those within the purview of national governments. The values shifts that we see continuing in Canada are part of broader rhythms of post-materialism which are evident throughout the advanced western world (and which may be becoming more global in nature).


While explicitly excluding fiscal conservatism from this claim, we can say without hesitation that the evidence is clear that Canadians are significantly *less* connected to socially conservative values than they were twenty years ago. This includes values such as respect for authority, traditional family values and minimal government (which may stray into the realm of fiscal conservatism).

Even more important, these values are much less relevant in certain portions of Canadian society such as younger Canada, metropolitan Canada, and university-educated Canada. In short, these socially conservative values have little relevance to the emerging, next Canada. While those values are highly motivating to the older core Conservative vote they are next to meaningless to the groups mentioned above.

A similar analysis of shifts in values and demographics in the United States has led Stanley Greenberg (former Clinton pollster) to refer to Republicanism as a "dying cult". While the political success of the Conservative Party in Canada would belie such a glib depiction here, those value gaps are even more pronounced in Canada and may soon cause issues of basic legitimacy. This may also be linked to a deepening generational divide that we discussed in an earlier article.

Figure 4-2: Personal sense of belonging

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...



Are these value shifts weakening Canadians' attachment to country or undermining a sense of belonging to Canada? The answer, evident in Figure 4-2, is no, or perhaps not yet. Just as values are not shaped by activities of the state, it appears that national attachment is quite robust in spite of these newer normative tensions.

Canadians' sense of belonging to the nation has remained very strong but the locus of national identity has shifted somewhat. Where in the past it was more connected to small-l liberalism, it is now more connected to small c-conservatism. The frustrated Canadian nationalism that Roger Gibbins noted simmering in Alberta in the nineties has now largely evaporated and Alberta is now the province most connected to Canada.

There are new fault lines around values and some of these are quite worrisome. But so far, national attachment has remained robust and some of the frustrated nationalists who once were on the outside of power are feeling very happy about the new order.



A final important note on the issue of ethnic identities. Like provincial identities, ethnic identities are exerting a weakening attraction for Canadians. This is important and interesting for two reasons.

First, the visceral fears of the early 1990s about immigration and multiculturalism weakening national identity appear to have been ill-founded. Second, ethnic identification declined over a period when ethnic heterogeneity increased quite dramatically.

All of this is good news. Canada appears to be a singular success story in managing the "clash of civilizations" problems which are plaguing Europe and the United States.



Detailed Tables

Most Important Goals and Values (Mean Value): 1/2

Q. If you were to direct Canadian Society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be? Please rate your response on a scale from 0, not at all important, to 100, the highest possible importance, with 50 being moderately important.

	Freedom	Integrity and ethics	A healthy population	Collective human rights	A clean environment	Security and safety	Tolerance
NATIONALLY	87	86	85	83	83	78	77
REGION							
British Columbia	90	91	89	84	86	75	80
Alberta	88	85	81	81	79	79	75
Saskatchewan	86	86	85	79	81	81	77
Manitoba	87	85	87	76	83	82	74
Ontario	88	87	84	83	83	79	77
Quebec	84	81	87	84	83	76	74
Atlantic Canada	88	86	84	82	80	80	77
GENDER							
Male	87	86	84	80	81	75	75
Female	87	86	86	86	84	81	79
AGE							
<25	86	84	84	90	84	69	80
25-44	85	83	83	81	82	75	75
45-64	89	89	86	82	83	83	76
65+	91	89	89	79	82	84	81
EDUCATION							
High school or less	87	84	85	83	81	82	78
College or CEGEP	90	86	85	82	83	80	73
University or higher	85	87	85	83	84	74	80
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party of Canada	90	87	83	75	74	85	70
NDP	86	88	88	89	88	75	83
Liberal Party of Canada	87	84	86	83	84	78	79
Green Party	86	86	84	86	90	71	80
Bloc Quebecois	80	76	83	81	82	73	73
Other	95	90	82	83	84	46	71

Most Important Goals and Values (Mean Value): 2/2

Q. If you were to direct Canadian Society as to which goals or values should be most important in its direction, how important would you say each of the following goals and values should be? Please rate your response on a scale from 0, not at all important, to 100, the highest possible importance, with 50 being moderately important.

	Social equality	Hard work	Sharing of wealth	Prosperity and wealth	Respect for authority	Traditional family values	Minimal government intrusions
NATIONALLY	77	77	69	66	65	60	57
REGION							
British Columbia	80	80	68	63	58	53	61
Alberta	73	82	63	65	68	63	60
Saskatchewan	73	75	72	62	74	65	50
Manitoba	74	81	68	70	69	66	57
Ontario	77	79	68	68	64	58	57
Quebec	77	65	74	64	66	65	53
Atlantic Canada	78	84	67	66	72	67	62
GENDER							
Male	73	78	66	69	63	57	58
Female	81	75	73	62	67	64	55
AGE							
<25	82	71	72	63	50	44	43
25-44	75	74	68	65	63	55	55
45-64	77	80	69	67	70	68	62
65+	75	80	67	66	75	72	59
EDUCATION							
High school or less	77	77	70	65	70	68	62
College or CEGEP	77	79	68	67	69	69	63
University or higher	76	74	69	65	58	48	48
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION							
Conservative Party of Canada	66	85	53	70	75	75	70
NDP	85	73	79	62	58	50	47
Liberal Party of Canada	78	78	69	68	66	59	54
Green Party	80	73	73	56	53	41	53
Bloc Quebecois	76	57	81	58	63	66	48
Other	62	73	66	63	34	49	85

Personal Sense of Belonging: Family

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to...?

Your family

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	5%	6%	88%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	5%	5%	90%	0%	141	8.3
Alberta	1%	7%	91%	1%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	2%	10%	88%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	10%	8%	82%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	6%	5%	88%	1%	509	4.3
Quebec	5%	7%	86%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	5%	2%	94%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	5%	8%	86%	1%	688	3.7
Female	5%	4%	91%	0%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	7%	7%	87%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	5%	6%	89%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	5%	6%	88%	0%	501	4.4
65+	5%	4%	90%	1%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	5%	5%	88%	2%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	5%	6%	89%	0%	429	4.7
University or higher	5%	7%	88%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	4%	4%	92%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	6%	6%	88%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	5%	6%	88%	1%	250	6.2
Green Party	6%	9%	85%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	8%	4%	88%	0%	49	14.0
Other	6%	0%	89%	5%	16	24.5

Personal Sense of Belonging: Canada

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to ...?

Canada

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	13%	12%	74%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	9%	10%	81%	0%	141	8.3
Alberta	5%	6%	88%	2%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	3%	6%	91%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	8%	7%	85%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	6%	9%	85%	0%	509	4.3
Quebec	37%	23%	38%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	6%	8%	86%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	15%	9%	75%	1%	688	3.7
Female	11%	15%	73%	1%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	15%	14%	72%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	20%	13%	67%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	8%	11%	80%	1%	501	4.4
65+	7%	8%	86%	0%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	11%	9%	78%	2%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	15%	14%	71%	0%	429	4.7
University or higher	13%	12%	75%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	6%	7%	87%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	17%	11%	72%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	6%	12%	82%	1%	250	6.2
Green Party	4%	16%	80%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	64%	29%	7%	0%	49	14.0
Other	23%	5%	68%	5%	16	24.5

Personal Sense of Belonging: Province

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to ...?

Province

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	18%	21%	60%	1%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	18%	22%	59%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	16%	18%	65%	1%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	9%	6%	85%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	14%	23%	64%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	25%	26%	48%	0%	509	4.3
Quebec	12%	17%	70%	1%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	8%	13%	79%	0%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	20%	20%	60%	1%	688	3.7
Female	17%	22%	61%	0%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	21%	25%	54%	0%	73	11.5
25-44	23%	19%	58%	1%	387	5.0
45-64	15%	21%	64%	1%	501	4.4
65+	11%	23%	66%	0%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	15%	17%	67%	1%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	18%	22%	59%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	21%	22%	57%	0%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	15%	22%	63%	0%	334	5.4
NDP	19%	19%	62%	0%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	21%	22%	57%	0%	250	6.2
Green Party	22%	29%	49%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	8%	11%	81%	0%	49	14.0
Other	22%	24%	49%	5%	16	24.5

Personal Sense of Belonging: Ethnic Group or National Ancestry

Q. How strong is your own personal sense of belonging to ...?

Ethnic group or national ancestry

	Not strong (1-3)	Moderately strong (4)	Extremely strong (5-7)	DK/NR	Sample Size	Margin of Error (+/-)
NATIONALLY	32%	23%	43%	2%	1181	2.9
REGION						
British Columbia	47%	19%	33%	1%	141	8.3
Alberta	42%	19%	36%	2%	125	8.8
Saskatchewan	44%	18%	39%	0%	35	16.6
Manitoba	37%	31%	32%	0%	41	15.3
Ontario	33%	25%	40%	2%	509	4.3
Quebec	16%	22%	59%	2%	218	6.6
Atlantic Canada	32%	17%	49%	3%	106	9.5
GENDER						
Male	35%	22%	40%	2%	688	3.7
Female	29%	23%	47%	1%	493	4.4
AGE						
<25	33%	20%	43%	4%	73	11.5
25-44	33%	22%	44%	2%	387	5.0
45-64	31%	25%	44%	1%	501	4.4
65+	32%	23%	43%	2%	179	7.3
EDUCATION						
High school or less	31%	21%	44%	4%	309	5.6
College or CEGEP	27%	28%	44%	1%	429	4.7
University or higher	37%	19%	42%	1%	443	4.7
CURRENT VOTE INTENTION						
Conservative Party	29%	26%	44%	1%	334	5.4
NDP	38%	22%	39%	2%	313	5.5
Liberal Party	30%	22%	46%	2%	250	6.2
Green Party	46%	22%	32%	0%	70	11.7
Bloc Quebecois	18%	16%	66%	0%	49	14.0
Other	53%	19%	23%	5%	16	24.5



Methodology

This series draws on data collected from **five separate surveys**. Two of these surveys used Interactive Voice Response (IVR) technology, which allows respondents to enter their preferences by punching the keypad on their phone, rather than telling them to an operator.

In an effort to reduce the coverage bias of landline only RDD, we created a dual landline/cell phone RDD sampling frame for this research. As a result, we are able to reach those with a landline and cell phone, as well as cell phone only households and landline only households. This dual frame yields a near perfect unweighted distribution on age group and gender, something almost never seen with traditional landline RDD sample or interviewer-administered surveys. This methodology is not to be confused with the increasing proliferation of non-probability opt-in online panels which have recently been incorrectly reported in major national media with inappropriate margin of error estimates.

The field dates for the **first survey** are February 21-28, 2012. In total, a random sample of 3,699 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.6 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **second survey** are November 20 – December 3, 2012. In total, a random sample of 5,433 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey (including a sub-sample of 4,548 decided and leaning voters). The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.3 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The three remaining surveys were conducted exclusively online using EKOS' unique, hybrid online/telephone research panel, Probit. Our panel offers exhaustive coverage of the Canadian population (i.e., Internet, phone, cell phone), random recruitment (in other words, participants are recruited randomly, they do not opt themselves into our panel), and equal probability sampling. All respondents to our panel are recruited by telephone using random digit dialling and are confirmed by live interviewers. Unlike opt-in online panels, Probit supports margin of error estimates. We believe this to be the only probability-based online panel in Canada.

The field dates for the **third survey** are December 14-21, 2011. In total, 2,005 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-2.2 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **fourth survey** are January 27 – February 8, 2012. In total, 2,891 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-1.8 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the **fifth survey** are November 20-29, 2012. In total, 1,181 Canadians aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/-2.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.



Please note that the margin of error increases when the results are sub-divided (i.e., error margins for sub-groups such as region, sex, age, education). All the data have been statistically weighted to ensure the samples composition reflects that of the actual population of Canada according to Census data.